

Second-Order Induction and Agreement*

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Abstract

Agents make predictions based on similar past cases. The notion of similarity is itself learnt from experience by “second-order induction”: past cases inform agents also about the relative importance of various attributes in judging similarity. However, there may be multiple “optimal” similarity functions for explaining past data. Moreover, the computation of the optimal similarity function is NP-Hard. We offer conditions under which rational agents who have access to the same observations are likely to converge on the same predictions, and conditions under which they may entertain different probabilistic beliefs.

1 Introduction

Economic theory tends to assume that, given the same information, rational agents would entertain the same beliefs: differences in beliefs can only arise from asymmetric information. In the standard Bayesian model, this assumption is incarnated in the attribution of the same prior probability to all agents, and it is referred to as the “Common Prior Assumption”. Differences in beliefs cannot be commonly known, as proved by Aumann (1976) in the celebrated “agreeing to disagree” result.

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The Common Prior Assumption has been the subject of heated debates (see Morris, 1995, Gul, 1998, as well as Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987 in the context of Aumann, 1987). We suggest that it might be easier to judge the reasonability of this assumption and its appropriateness for various set-ups, if we delve into the process of belief formation. That is, if we explicitly model the way in which agents generate their beliefs, we can see under which conditions it makes sense to assume that different agents, having access to the same information, will end up with the same beliefs, and when it might be plausible to allow for disagreement among rational agents.

This paper makes a tentative step in this direction. We consider a specific process of generation of probabilistic beliefs, and study conditions under which it is likely to yield a unique prior, and conditions under which non-uniqueness is likely to arise.^{1 2}

There are many situations in which empirical frequencies offer natural candidates for probabilities. For example, an agent who considers buying an insurance policy against car theft may access a large database of practically identical cases, and infer what her probabilities should be from the relative frequency of thefts in the database. But there are also many economic problems in which past cases are given, yet are not entirely identical. In judging the likelihood of an imminent financial crisis or a revolution, one would be silly to ignore past cases. At the same time, one may not assume that all past observations are results of an i.i.d. process. Even if one were to ignore possible causal relationships between past cases and future ones, each case has sufficiently many relevant details to make it unique. Hence, the calculation of empirical frequencies is not as straightforward as in the example of a

¹When prior probabilities may vary across individuals, one may wish to study more general models of beliefs, allowing for *all* the probabilities that rational agents might adopt. However, we consider agents who, following Ramsey, (1926a,b), de Finetti, (1931,1937), Savage, (1954), and Anscombe-Aumann (1963), insist on summarizing their beliefs in well-defined prior beliefs.

²The process of belief generation studied here can be embedded in a model of Bayesian learning as well. See subsection 4.3 below.

car theft, let alone in examples of chance games such as the toss of a coin.

We assume that in such problems agents use past data to estimate probabilities, but also use their judgment to determine which cases are more similar, and therefore more relevant for the problem at hand. Using similarity-weighted averages is an intuitive idea that appeared in statistics as “kernel methods” (Akaike, 1954, Rosenblatt, 1956, Parzen, 1962) and is also reminiscent of “exemplar learning” in psychology (see Medin and Schaffer, 1978, and Nosofsky, 1988). Thus, it is a model of belief formation that can be interpreted both normatively and descriptively, and it can also be derived axiomatically (Billot, Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler, 2005, Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler, [GLS] 2006). However, such a process begs the question: where would the similarity function come from?

The notion of “second-order induction” suggests that the similarity function should also be learnt from past cases. Using a given similarity function to learn from past cases about future ones can be referred to as “first-order induction”; learning the similarity function, that is, learning how this first-order induction should be done is dubbed “second-order induction”. For example, suppose that one has to predict the quality of a car. Children may make similarity judgments based on perceptual features, such as color. Adults will typically realize that the make of the car is a more important feature than its color. Asked why, a person might say, “Experience has shown that cars with the same color may be very different in quality, and vice versa – the exact same car can be found in very different colors. In short, over the years I learned that color isn’t an important feature for judging quality.”

We model this type of reasoning by looking for a similarity function that provides a good fit for the data. We use a leave-one-out cross-validation technique: for each similarity function, within a given class, we consider the prediction it would suggest for each given observation, based on the other ones. Each similarity function can thus be assessed by the sum of squared errors its predictions would have had, and a function that obtains a

best fit is referred to as “an empirical similarity”. We suggest this form of learning as an obviously-idealized model of the way people naturally learn which variables are important for similarity judgments. This learning process has been suggested and analyzed in GLS (2006) as a statistical technique. Indeed, it can also be interpreted normatively, as a way of performing non-parametric statistics with a kernel function that is estimated from the data. This is akin to finding an optimal bandwidth for kernel estimation (see, for instance, Park and Marron, 1990). However, in this paper our focus is descriptive, and we use the model to describe human reasoning.³

The paper studies the notion of empirical similarity and focuses on its implications for the formation of beliefs by economic agents. We first point out that the empirical similarity function need not take into account all the variables available. For reasons that have to do both with the curse of dimensionality and with overfitting, one may prefer to use a relatively small set of the variables to a superset thereof. We provide conditions under which it is worthwhile to add a variable to the arguments of the similarity function and discuss their applicability to economic set-ups. Next, we observe that the empirical similarity need not be unique, and that people who have access to the same database may end up using different similarity functions to obtain the “best” fit. This is one reason that their predictions might disagree. Further, we show that finding the best similarity function is a computationally complex (NP-Hard) problem. Thus, even if the empirical similarity is unique, it does not immediately follow that all agents can find it. Rational agents might therefore end up using different, suboptimal similarity functions. This is a second reason why their beliefs might disagree.

There are many modeling choices to be made, in terms of the nature of the variables (the predictors and the predicted), as well as the similarity function. We study here two extreme cases: in the “binary” model all the

³In this sense our paper is similar to Bray (1982), who considers a statistical technique, namely OLS, as a model of economic agents’ reasoning.

variables take only the values $\{0, 1\}$, and so does the similarity function. Further, we consider only similarity functions that are defined by weights in $\{0, 1\}$: each variable is either taken into account or not, and two observations are similar (to degree 1) if and only if they are equal on all the relevant variables. In the “continuous” model, by contrast, all variables (predictors and predicted) are continuous, and the similarity function is allowed to take any non-negative value as well. We focus on functions that are exponential in weighted Euclidean distances where the weights are allowed to be non-negative extended real numbers.

In both models we find the same qualitative conclusions: (i) If the number of predictors is fixed, and the predicted variable is a function of the predictors, then, as the number of observations grows following an i.i.d. process, the empirical similarity will learn the functional relationship. The similarity function is likely to be unique in the binary model, but even if it is not, different empirical similarity functions would provide the same predictions (Propositions 2 and 4). By contrast (ii) If the number of predictors is large relative to the number of observations, it is highly probable that the empirical similarity will not be unique (Propositions 3 and 5). Further, (iii) If the number of predictors is not bounded, the problem of finding the empirical similarity is NPC (Theorems 1 and 2).

Revisiting the examples mentioned above, let us contrast the insurance and the revolution problems. In the former, we try to estimate the probability of a car being stolen. Several variables are relevant, such as the car’s worth, the neighborhood in which it is parked, and so forth. However, one can think of this number is relatively limited. However, the number of observations that might reasonably be considered i.i.d. is very large. In this type of problems it stands to reason that different people would come up with the same similarity functions, or at least with similarity functions that provide similar predictions. By contrast, in the revolution example the number of observations is very limited. One cannot gather more data at will, neither

by experimentation nor by empirical research. To complicate things further, the number of variables that might be relevant predictors may be very large. Researchers may come up with novel perspectives on a given history, and suggest new military, economic, and sociological variables (to name just a few categories) which may be related to causes of successes and failures of revolutions. It is therefore not surprising that experts may disagree on the best explanation of historical events, and, consequently, on predictions for the future.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the questions of monotonicity, uniqueness, and computational complexity of the empirical similarity function in the binary model, while Section 3 provides the counterpart analysis for the continuous model. Section 4 concludes with a general discussion.

2 A Binary Model

2.1 Case-Based Beliefs

The basic problem we deal with is predicting a value of a variable y based on other variables x^1, \dots, x^m . We assume that there are n observations of the values of the x variables and the corresponding y values, and, given a new value for the x 's, attempt to predict the value of y . This problem is, of course, a standard one in statistics and in machine learning. However, in these fields the goal is basically to find a prediction method that does well according to some criteria. By contrast, our interest is in modeling how people tend to reason about such problems⁴. We focus here on prediction by rather basic

⁴Luckily, the two questions are not divorced from each other. For example, linear regression has been used as a model of reasoning of economic agents (see Bray, 1982). Similarly, non-parametric statistics suggested kernel methods (see Akaike, 1954, Rosenblatt, 1956, Parzen, 1962, and Silverman, 1986) which turned out to be equivalent to models of human reasoning. Specifically, a kernel-weighted average is equivalent to “exemplar learning” in psychology, and various kernel techniques ended up being identical to similarity-based techniques axiomatized in decision theory. (See Gilboa and Schmeidler,

case-based formulae.⁵ These are equivalent to kernel methods, but we stick to the terms “cases” and “similarity” – rather than “observations” and “kernel” – in order to emphasize the descriptive interpretation adopted here.

We assume that prediction is made based on a similarity function $s : X \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$. Such a function is applied to the observable characteristics of the problem at hand, $x_p = (x_p^1, \dots, x_p^m)$, and the corresponding ones for each past observation, $x_i = (x_i^1, \dots, x_i^m)$, so that $s(x_i, x_p)$ would measure the degree to which the past case is similar to the present one. The similarity function should incorporate not only intrinsic similarity judgments, but also judgments of relevance, probability of recall and so forth.⁶

In this section we present a binary model, according to which all the variables – the predictors, x^1, \dots, x^m , and the predicted, y – as well as the weights of the variables in the similarity function and the similarity function itself take values in $\{0, 1\}$. This is obviously a highly simplified model that is used to convey some basic points.

More formally, let the set of predictors be indexed by $j \in M \equiv \{1, \dots, m\}$ for $m \geq 0$. When no confusion is likely to arise, we will refer to the predictor as a “variable” and also refer to the index as designating the variable. The predictors $x \equiv (x^1, \dots, x^m)$ assume values (jointly) in $X \equiv \{0, 1\}^m$ and the predicted variable, y , – in $\{0, 1\}$. The *prediction problem* is defined by a pair (B, x_p) where $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$ (with $n \geq 0$) is a database of past observations (or “cases”), $x_i = (x_i^1, \dots, x_i^m) \in X$, and $y_i \in \{0, 1\}$, and $x_p \in X$ is a new data point. The goal is to predict the value of $y_p \in \{0, 1\}$ corresponding to x_p , or, more generally, to estimate its distribution.

Given a function $s : X \times X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, the probability that $y_p = 1$ is estimated by the similarity weighted average⁷

2012.)

⁵As in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001, 2012).

⁶Typically, the time at which a case occurred would be part of the variables x , and thus recency can also be incorporated into the similarity function.

⁷Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2006) provide axioms on likelihood judgments (conditioned on databases) that are equivalent to the existence of a function s such that

$$\bar{y}_p^s = \frac{\sum_{i \leq n} s(x_i, x_p) y_i}{\sum_{i \leq n} s(x_i, x_p)} \quad (1)$$

if $\sum_{i \leq n} s(x_i, x_p) > 0$ and $\bar{y}_p^s = 0.5$ otherwise.

This formula is identical to the kernel-averaging method (where the similarity s plays the role of the kernel function). Because the similarity function only takes values in $\{0, 1\}$, it divides the database into observations (x_i, y_i) whose x values are similar (to degree 1) to x_p , and those who are not (that is, similar to degree 0), and estimates the probability that y_p be 1 by the relative empirical frequencies of 1's in the sub-database of similar observations.

Finally, we specify the similarity function as follows: given weights for the variables, $(w^1, \dots, w^m) \in X (\equiv \{0, 1\}^m)$, let

$$s_w(x_i, x_p) = \prod_{\{j | w^j = 1\}} \mathbf{1}_{\{x_i^j = x_p^j\}} \quad (2)$$

Thus, the weights (w^1, \dots, w^m) determine which variables are taken into consideration, and the similarity of two vectors is 1 iff they are identical on these variables. Clearly, the relation “having similarity 1” is an equivalence relation. This restrictive assumption will not hold in the continuous version of the model presented in section 3.

2.2 Empirical Similarity

Where does the similarity function come from? The various axiomatic results mentioned above state that, under certain conditions on likelihood or probabilistic judgments, such a function exists, but they do not specify which function it is, or which functions are more reasonable for certain applications than others. The notion of second-order induction is designed to capture the idea that the choice of a similarity function is made based on data as well. It is thus suggested that, within a given class of possible functions, \mathcal{S} ,

(5) holds for any database B . Billot, Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2005) consider the similarity-weighted averaging of probability vectors with more than two entries.

one choose a function that fits the data best. Finding the weights w such that, when fed into s_w , fit the data best renders the empirical similarity problem parametric: while the prediction of the value of y is done in a non-parametric way (as in kernel estimation), relying on the entire database for each prediction, the estimation of the similarity function itself is reduced to the estimation of m parameters.

To what extent does a function “fit the data”? One popular technique to evaluate the degree to which a prediction technique fits the data is the “leave one out” cross-validation technique: for each observation i , one may ask what would have been the prediction for that observation, given all the other observations, and use a loss function to assess the fit. In our case, for a database $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$ and a similarity function s , we simulate the estimation of the probability that $y_i = 1$, if only the other observations $\{(x_k, y_k)\}_{k \neq i}$ were given, using the function s ; the resulting estimate is compared to the actual value of y_i , and the similarity is evaluated by the mean squared error it would have had.

Explicitly, let there be given a set of similarity functions \mathcal{S} . (In our case, $\mathcal{S} = \{s_w \mid w \in X\}$.) For $s \in \mathcal{S}$, let

$$\bar{y}_i^s = \frac{\sum_{k \neq i} s(x_k, x_i) y_k}{\sum_{k \neq i} s(x_k, x_i)}$$

if $\sum_{j \neq i} s(x_j, x_i) > 0$ and $\bar{y}_i^s = 0.5$ otherwise. Define the mean squared error to be

$$MSE(s) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (\bar{y}_i^s - y_i)^2}{n}.$$

It will be useful to define, for a set of variables indexed by $J \subseteq M$, the indicator function of J , w_J , that is,

$$w_J^l = \begin{cases} 1 & l \in J \\ 0 & l \notin J \end{cases}.$$

To simplify notation, we will use $MSE(J)$ for $MSE(s_{w_J})$.

The similarity functions we consider divide the database into sub-databases, or “bins”, according to the values of the variables in J . Formally, for $J \subseteq M$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^J$, define the J - z bin to be the cases in B that correspond to these values⁸. Formally, we will refer to the set of indices of these cases, that is,

$$b(J, z) = \{ i \leq n \mid x_i^j = z^j \quad \forall j \in J \}$$

as “the J - z bin”.

It will also be convenient to define, for $J \subseteq M$, and $z \in \{0, 1\}^J$, $j \in M \setminus J$, and $z^j \in \{0, 1\}$, the bin obtained from adding the value z^j to z . We will denote it by

$$(J \cdot j, z \cdot z^j) = (J \cup \{j\}, z')$$

where $z^l = z^l$ for $l \in J$ and $z'^j = z^j$.

Clearly, a set $J \subseteq M$ defines $2^{|J|}$ such bins (many of which may be empty). A new point x_p corresponds to one such bin. The probabilistic prediction for y_p corresponding to x_p is the average frequency of 1’s in it. If a bin is empty, this prediction is 0.5. Formally, the prediction is given by

$$\bar{y}^{(J,z)} = \frac{\sum_{i \in b(J,z)} y_i}{|b(J,z)|} \quad (3)$$

if $|b(J,z)| > 0$ and $\bar{y}^{(J,z)} = 0.5$ otherwise.

For the sake of calculating the empirical similarity, for each $i \leq n$ we consider the bin containing it, $b(J,z)$, and the value \bar{y}_i^s is the average frequency of 1’s in the bin once observation i has been removed from it. If $b(J,z) = \{i\}$, that is, the bin contains but one observation, taking one out leaves us with an empty database, resulting in a probabilistic prediction – and an error – of 0.5. Formally, the leave-one-out prediction for $i \in b(J,z)$ is

$$\bar{y}_i^{(J,z)} = \frac{\sum_{k \in b(J,z), k \neq i} y_k}{|b(J,z)| - 1} \quad (4)$$

⁸Splitting the database into such bins is clearly an artifact of the binary model. We analyze a more realistic continuous model in Section 3.

if $|b(J, z)| > 1$ and $\bar{y}_i^{(J,z)} = 0.5$ otherwise.

Given the predictions $\bar{y}_i^{(J,z)}$, we can now calculate $MSE(J)$ for all the possible similarity functions. We will not, however, stop here and select the similarity function that minimizes the mean squared error as the “empirical similarity”. There is one more element to consider. In choosing a subset of variables to be included in J , it seems likely that people would prefer a smaller set of predictors, given a fixed level of goodness of fit, and that they would even be willing to trade off the two.⁹ There are two types of considerations leading to such a preference. The first, statistical considerations are normative in nature, and have to do with avoiding overfitting. The second are psychological, and have a descriptive flavor: people may not be able to recall and process too many variables¹⁰. Moreover, one may argue that such preference for a smaller set of predictors is evolutionarily selected partly due to the statistical normative considerations. We will capture this preference using the simplest model that conveys our point. Let us assume that the agent selects a similarity function that minimizes an *adjusted mean squared error*. Formally, the agent is assumed to select a set of indices J that minimizes

$$AMSE(J, c) \equiv MSE(J) + c|J|$$

for some $c \geq 0$. We will typically think of c as small, so that goodness of fit would outweigh simplicity as theory selection criteria, but as positive, so that complexity isn’t ignored. Given a cost c , we will refer to a similarity function $s = s_{w_J}$ for $J \in \arg \min AMSE(J, c)$ as an *empirical similarity function*.

We now turn to analyze the properties of the empirical similarity, to address the question of whether we should expect rational agents with access

⁹As we will shortly, for case-based prediction the minimization of the *SSE* may favor smaller sets of predictors even without the introduction of preference for simplicity.

¹⁰As a normative theory, the preference for simple theories is famously attributed to William of Ockam (though he was not explicitly referring to out-of-sample prediction errors), and runs throughout the statistical literature of the 20th century (see Akaike, 1974). As a descriptive theory, the preference for simplicity appears in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* (1923) at the latest.

to a common database to agree on their predictions.

2.3 Monotonicity

We start by showing that using a relatively small set of variables for prediction might be desirable even with $c = 0$, because the goodness-of-fit (for a given database) can *decrease* when adding one more predictor: MSE can be non-monotone with respect to set inclusion.¹¹ The reason is a version of the problem known as “the curse of dimensionality”: more variables that are included in the determination of similarity would make a given database more “sparse”. The following example illustrates.

Example 1 Let $n = 4$ and $m = 1$. Consider the following database and the corresponding MSE’s of the subsets of the variables:

i	x_i^1	y_i	J	$MSE(J)$
1	0	0	\emptyset	4/9
2	0	1	{1}	1
3	1	0		
4	1	1		

The specific form of the curse of dimensionality that affects the leave-one-out criterion is due to the fact that this criterion compares each observation (y) to the average of the *other* observations. A bin that contains $a > 0$ cases with $y_i = 1$ and $b > 0$ cases with $y_i = 0$ has an average y of $\frac{a}{a+b}$. But when an observation $y_i = 1$ is taken out, it is compared to the average of the remaining ones, $\frac{a-1}{a+b-1} < \frac{a}{a+b}$, and vice versa for $y_i = 0$ (which is compared to $\frac{a}{a+b-1} > \frac{a}{a+b}$). In both cases, the squared error in the leave-one-out computation decreases in the size of the bin because the larger the bin, the smaller the impact of taking out a single observation on the average of the remaining ones.

¹¹Notice that this cannot happen with other statistical techniques such as linear regression.

The above suggests that in appropriately-defined “large” databases the curse of dimensionality would be less severe and adding variables to the set of predictors would be easier than in smaller databases. To make this comparison meaningful, and control for other differences between the databases, we can compare a given database with “replications” thereof, where the counters a and b above are replaced by ta and tb for some $t > 1$. Formally, we will use the following definition.

Definition 1 *Given two databases $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$ and $B' = \{(x'_k, y'_k)\}_{k \leq tn}$ (for $t \geq 1$), we say that B' is a t -replica of B if, for every $k \leq tn$, $(x'_k, y'_k) = (x_i, y_i)$ where $i = k \pmod n$.*

Consider a database B' which is a t -replica of the database in Example 1. It can readily be verified that

$$MSE(\emptyset) = \left(\frac{2t}{4t-1}\right)^2 < \left(\frac{t}{2t-1}\right)^2 = MSE(\{1\}).$$

Indeed, the dramatic difference of the MSE 's in Example 1 ($[MSE(\{1\}) - MSE(\emptyset)]$) is smaller for larger t 's, and converges to 0 as $t \rightarrow \infty$. However, it is still positive. This suggests that there is something special about Example 1 beyond the size of the database. Indeed, the variable in question, x^1 , is completely uninformative: the distribution of y is precisely the same in each bin (i.e., for $x^1 = 0$ and for $x^1 = 1$), and thus there is little wonder that splitting the database into these two bins can only result in larger errors due to the smaller bin sizes, with no added explanatory power to offset it. Formally, we define informativeness of a variable (for the prediction of y in a database B) relative to a set of other variables as a binary property:

Definition 2 *A variable $j \in M$ is informative relative to a subset $J \subseteq M \setminus \{j\}$ in database $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$ if there exists $z \in \{0, 1\}^J$ such that $|b(J, z \cdot 0)|, |b(J, z \cdot 1)| > 0$ and*

$$\bar{y}^{(J, z \cdot 0)} \neq \bar{y}^{(J, z \cdot 1)}.$$

In other words, a variable x^j is informative for a subset of the variables, J , if, for at least one assignment of values to these variables, the relative frequency of $y = 1$ in the bin defined by these values and $x^j = 1$ and the relative frequency defined by the same values and $x^j = 0$ are different.

One reason that a variable j may be uninformative relative to a set of other variables is that it can be completely determined by them. Formally,

Definition 3 A variable $j \in M$ is a function of $J \subseteq M \setminus \{j\}$ in database $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$ if there is a function $f : \{0, 1\}^J \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that, for all $i \leq n$, $x_i^j = f\left(\left(x_i^k\right)_{k \in J}\right)$.

If j is a function of J , the bins defined by J and by $J \cup \{j\}$ are identical, and clearly j cannot be informative relative to J . However, as we saw above, a variable j may fail to be informative relative to J also if it isn't a function of J . To determine whether j is a function of J we need not consult the y values. Informativeness, by contrast, is conceptually akin to correlation of the variable x^j with y given the variables in J .

We can finally state conditions under which more variables are guaranteed to result in a lower MSE . Intuitively, we want to start by adding a variable that is informative (relative to those already in use), and to make sure that the database isn't split into too small bins. Formally,

Proposition 1 Assume that j is informative relative to $J \subseteq M \setminus \{j\}$ in the database $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$. Then there exists a $T \geq 1$ such that, for all $t \geq T$, for a t -replica of B , $MSE(J \cup \{j\}) < MSE(J)$. Conversely, if j is not informative relative to J , then for any t -replica of B , $MSE(J \cup \{j\}) \geq MSE(J)$, with a strict inequality unless j is a function of J .

We note in passing that informativeness of a variable does not satisfy monotonicity with respect to set inclusion:

Observation 1 *Let there be given a database $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$, a variable $j \in M$, and two subsets $J \subseteq J' \subseteq M \setminus \{j\}$. It is possible that j is informative for J , but not for J' as well as vice versa.*

2.4 Uniqueness

We have seen in section 2.3 that monotonicity of the MSE is not generally guaranteed. Immediate implications are that the best fit is not necessarily achieved by a unique subset of variables J , and in particular that it is not necessarily achieved by the full set of all available predictors ($J = M$). This raises the issue of when can we reasonably expect rational agents faced with the same prediction problem to adopt the same empirical similarity. In this section, we derive two results that characterize sufficient conditions for the two possible cases. Proposition 2 identifies a class of prediction problems for which including all available predictors in the similarity function does indeed minimize the MSE , hence the $AMSE$ too as long as the cost c is sufficiently small. At the other extreme, Proposition 3 identifies a class of prediction problems for which at least two disjoint subsets of variables minimize MSE and $AMSE$. The comparison between the conditions in Propositions 2 and 3 sheds light on features of a prediction problem that make agreement among rational agents more or less likely to occur.

Let us first consider data generating processes that are conducive to the inclusion of all variables in the empirical similarity. Assume that the values of the predictors, (x_i) are i.i.d. with a joint distribution g on X , and that $y_i = f(x_i)$ for a fixed $f : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$.¹² Let us refer to this data generating process as (g, f) . We introduce the following definition, then present our result:

Definition 4 *A variable $j \in M$ is informative for (g, f) if there are values*

¹²One may consider more general cases in which y is random, and $P(y_i = 1 | x_i) = f(x_i)$ for some $f : X \rightarrow [0, 1]$. In this case one can prove results that are similar to Proposition 4 below.

$z^{-j} = (z^k)_{k \neq j}$ such that (i) $f(z^{-j} \cdot 0) \neq f(z^{-j} \cdot 1)$; and (ii) $g(z^{-j} \cdot 0), g(z^{-j} \cdot 1) > 0$, where $z \cdot q \in X$ is the vector obtained by augmenting z^{-j} with $z^j = q$ for $q \in \{0, 1\}$.

Proposition 2 Assume a data generating process (g, f) where all $j \in M$ are informative for (g, f) . Then there exists $\bar{c} > 0$ such that, for all $c \in (0, \bar{c})$,

$$P \left(\arg \min_{J \subseteq M} AMSE(J, c) = \{M\} \right) \rightarrow_{n \rightarrow \infty} 1$$

The proposition thus says that, if there is an underlying relationship so that the distribution of y_i is a function of x_i , but x_i alone, and this function remains constant for all observations, then, with a large enough database (i.e. fixing m and allowing n to grow) the only set of predictors that minimize the $AMSE$ is the set of all predictors – unless some of them are not informative.

By contrast, let us now consider the other extreme case, where n is fixed and m is allowed to grow. In this case, under fairly general probabilistic assumptions, we find the opposite conclusion, namely that non-uniqueness is the rule rather than the exception. Formally, fix n and (letting m grow) assume that for each new variable j , and for every $i \leq n$,

$$P(x_i^j = 1 \mid x_k^l, l < j \text{ or } (l = j, k < i)) \in (\eta, 1 - \eta)$$

for a fixed $\eta \in (0, 0.5)$. That is, we consider a rather general joint distribution of the variables $x^j = (x_i^j)_{i \leq n}$, with the only constraint that the probability of the next observed value, x_i^j , being 1 or 0, conditional on all past observed values, is uniformly bounded away from 0, where “past” is read to mean “an observation of a lower-index variable or an earlier observation of the same variable”. For such a process we can state:

Proposition 3 For every $n \geq 4$, every $c \geq 0$, and every $\eta \in (0, 0.5)$, if there are at least two cases with $y_i = 1$ and at least two with $y_i = 0$, then

$$P \left(\exists J, J' \in \arg \min_{J \subseteq M} AMSE(J, c), \right. \\ \left. J \cap J' = \emptyset \right) \rightarrow_{m \rightarrow \infty} 1$$

Proposition 2 can be viewed as dealing with a classical scientific problem, where the set of relevant variables is limited, and many observations are available, perhaps even by active experimentation. In this case we would expect that all informative variables would be used in the optimal similarity function (if the fixed cost per variable is sufficiently low). Thus the set of optimal functions will be a singleton, defined by the set M , and, in particular, different people who study the same database are likely to converge on the same similarity function and therefore on the same predictions for any new data point x_p . By contrast, Proposition 3 deals with cases that are more challenging to scientific study: the number of observations is fixed – which suggests that active experimentation is ruled out – and also considered to be small relative to the number of predictors that may be deemed relevant. The data generating process in Proposition 3 can be viewed as a model of a process in which people come up with additional possible predictors for a given set of cases. For example, presidential elections and revolutions have a number of relevant cases that is more or less fixed, but these cases can be viewed from new angles, by introducing new variables that might be pertinent. The Proposition suggests that, when more and more variables are considered, we should not be surprised if completely different (that is, disjoint) sets of variables are considered “best”, and, as a result, different people may entertain different beliefs about future observations based on the same data.

2.5 Complexity

Examples in which different sets of variables obtain precisely the same, minimal $AMSE$ might be knife-edge, hence disagreement might appear to be unlikely to occur in practice. In this section, we present a second reason why rational agents faced with the same prediction problem might adopt different similarity functions and disagree in their predictions. As the number of possible predictors in a database grows, so does the complexity of finding the

optimal set of variables, even if it is unique. Formally, we define the following problem:

Problem 1 EMPIRICAL-SIMILARITY: Given integers $m, n \geq 1$, a database $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$, and (rational) numbers $c, R \geq 0$, is there a set $J \subseteq M \equiv \{1, \dots, m\}$ such that $AMSE(J, c) \leq R$?

Thus, EMPIRICAL-SIMILARITY is the yes/no version of the optimization problem, “Find the empirical similarity for database B and constant c ”. We can now state

Theorem 1 *EMPIRICAL-SIMILARITY is NPC.*

It follows that, when many possible variables exist, we should not assume that people can find an (or the) empirical similarity. That is, it isn’t only the case that there are 2^m different subsets of variables, and therefore as many possible similarity functions to consider. There is no known algorithm that can find the optimal similarity in polynomial time, and it seems safe to conjecture that none would be found in the near future.¹³ Clearly, the practical import of this complexity result depends crucially on the number of variables, m .¹⁴ For example, if $m = 2$ and there are only 4 subsets of variables to consider, it makes sense to assume that people find the “best” one. Moreover, if n is large, the best one may well be all the informative variables.

3 A Continuous Model

One can extend the model to deal with continuous variables, allowing the predictors (x^1, \dots, x^m) to assume values (jointly) in a set $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ while the

¹³This result is the equivalent of the main result in Aragonés et al. (2005) for regression analysis. Thus, both in rule-based models and in case-based models of reasoning, it is a hard problem to find a small set of predictors that explain the data well.

¹⁴Indirectly, it also depends on n . If n is bounded, there could be only a bounded number (2^n) of different variable values, and additional ones need not be considered.

predicted variable, y , – in a set $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}$. It is natural to use the same formulae of similarity-weighted average used for the binary case, i.e.,

$$\bar{y}_p^s = \frac{\sum_{i \leq n} s(x_i, x_p) y_i}{\sum_{i \leq n} s(x_i, x_p)} \quad (5)$$

this time interpreted as the predicted value of y (rather than the estimation of the probability that it be 1). This formula was axiomatized in Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2006).¹⁵ In case $s(x_i, x_p) = 0$ for all $i \leq n$, we set $\bar{y}_p^s = y_0$ for an arbitrary value $y_0 \in Y$.¹⁶

For many purposes it makes sense to consider more general similarity functions, that would allow for values in the entire interval $[0, 1]$ and would not divide the database into neatly separated bins. In particular, Billot, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (2008) characterize similarity functions of the form

$$s(x, x') = e^{-n(x, x')}$$

where n is a norm on \mathbb{R}^m . Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2006) and Gayer, Gilboa, Lieberman (2007) also study the case of a weighted Euclidean distance, where

$$s^w(x, x') = \exp\left(-\sum_{j=1}^m w^j (x^j - x'^j)^2\right) \quad (7)$$

with $w_j \geq 0$.¹⁷

We will use the extended non-negative reals, $\mathbb{R}_+ \cup \{\infty\} = [0, \infty]$, allowing for the value $w^j = \infty$. Setting w^j to ∞ would be understood to imply

¹⁵If Y is discrete, we may also define the predicted value of y_p by

$$\hat{y}_p^s \in \arg \max_y \sum_{i \leq n} s(x_i, x_p) \mathbf{1}_{\{y=y_i\}} \quad (6)$$

which is equivalent to kernel classification and has been axiomatized in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003).

¹⁶We choose some value y_0 only to make the expression \bar{y}_p^s well-defined. Its choice will have no effect on our analysis.

¹⁷If one further assumes that there is a similarity-based data generating process driven by a function as the above, one may test hypotheses about the values of the weights w_j .

$s^w(x, x') = 0$ whenever $x^j \neq x'^j$, but if $x^j = x'^j$, the j -th summand in (7) will be taken to be zero. In other words, we allow for the value $w^j = \infty$ with the convention that $\infty \cdot 0 = 0$. This would make the binary model a special case of the current one. (Setting $w^j = \infty$ in (7) where $w^j = 1$ in (2).) For the computational model, the value ∞ will be considered an extended rational number, denoted by a special character (say “ ∞ ”). The computation of $s^w(x, x')$ first goes through all $j \leq m$, checking if there is one for which $x^j \neq x'^j$ and $w^j = \infty$. If this is the case, we set $s^w(x, x') = 0$. Otherwise, the computation proceeds with (7) where the summation is taken over all j 's such that $w^j < \infty$.

The definition of the empirical similarity extends to this case almost verbatim: the MSE is defined in the same way, and one can consider similarity functions given by (7) for some non-negative $(w^j)_{j \leq m}$. Rather than thinking of $MSE(s)$ as a function of a set of predictors, $J \subseteq M$, denoted $MSE(J)$ as above, one would consider it as a function of a vector of weights, $w = (w^j)_{j \leq m}$, denoted $MSE(w)$. We will similarly define the adjusted MSE by

$$AMSE(w, c) \equiv MSE(w) + c|J(w)|$$

where

$$J(w) = \{ j \leq m \mid w^j > 0 \}.$$

That is, a positive weight on a variable incurs a fixed cost. This cost can be thought of as the cost of obtaining the data about the variable in question, as well as the cognitive cost associated with retaining this data in memory and using it in calculations.

However, when we think of an empirical similarity as a function s^w that minimizes the $AMSE$, we should bear in mind the following.

Observation 2 *There are databases for which*

$$\arg \min_{w \in [0, \infty]^m} MSE(w) = \emptyset.$$

(This Observation is proved in the Appendix.) The reason that the argmin of the MSE may be empty is that the MSE is well-defined at $w^j = \infty$ but need not be continuous there. We will therefore be interested in vectors w that obtain the lowest MSE approximately.

We can define approximately optimal similarity: for $\varepsilon > 0$ let

$$\varepsilon\text{-arg min } AMSE = \left\{ w \in [0, \infty]^m \mid AMSE(w, c) \leq \inf_{w'} AMSE(w', c) + \varepsilon \right\}$$

Thus, the ε -arg min $AMSE$ is the set of weight vectors that are ε -optimal. We are interested in the shape of this set for small $\varepsilon > 0$.

3.1 Agreement

We argue that the main messages of our results in the binary case carry over to this model as well. Again, the key questions are the relative sizes of n and m , and the potential causal relationships between observations: when there are $n \gg m$ independent observations that obey a functional rule $y = f(x)$ – which, in particular, implies that x_i contains enough information to predict y_i – the optimal weights will be unique, and different people are likely to converge to the same opinion. By contrast, when $m \gg n$, it is likely that different sets of variable will explain the same (relatively small) set of observations.

Let us first consider the counterpart of (g, f) processes, where the observations (x_i, y_i) are i.i.d. For simplicity, assume that each x_i^j and each y_i is in the bounded interval $[-K, K]$ for $K > 0$. Let g be the joint density of x , with $g(z) \geq \eta > 0$ for all $x \in X \equiv [-K, K]^m$ and let a continuous $f : X \rightarrow [-K, K]$ be the underlying functional relationship between x and y so that¹⁸

$$y_i = f(x_i).$$

Refer to this data generating process as (g, f) .

¹⁸Similar conclusion would follow if we allow y_i to be distributed around $f(x_i)$ with an i.i.d. error term.

Proposition 4 Assume a data generating process (g, f) (where f is continuous). Let there be given $\nu, \xi > 0$. There are an integer N_0 and $W_0 \geq 0$ such that for every $n \geq N_0$, the vector w_0 defined by $w_0^j = W_0$ satisfies

$$P(MSE(w_0) < \nu) \geq 1 - \xi.$$

The proposition says that, if there is an underlying relationship so that y_i is a continuous function of x_i , and this function remains constant for all observations, then, when the database is large enough, with very high probability, this relationship can be uncovered. This is a variation on known results about convergence of kernel estimation techniques (see Nadaraya, 1964, Watson, 1964) and it is stated and proved here only for the sake of completeness.¹⁹

We take Proposition 4 as suggesting that, under the assumption of the (g, f) process, different individuals are likely to converge to similar beliefs about the value of y_p for a new case given by x_p within the known range. The exact similarity function that different people may choose may not always be identical. For example, if $x_i^1 = x_i^2$ for every observation in the database, one function s^w may obtain a near-perfect fit with $w^1 \gg 0$ and $w^2 = 0$ and another, $s^{w'}$, – with $w'^1 = 0$ and $w'^2 \gg 0$. If one individual uses s^w to make predictions, and another – $s^{w'}$, they will agree on the predicted values for all x that are similar to those they have encountered in the database. In a sense, they may agree on the conclusion but not on the reasoning. But, as long as they observe cases in which $x^1 = x^2$, they will not have major disagreements about any particular prediction.

However, we also have a counterpart of Proposition 3: given n, m , assume that for each $i \leq n$, y_i is drawn, given $(y_k)_{k < i}$, from a continuous distribution on $[-K, K]$ with a continuous density function h_i bounded below by $\eta > 0$. Let v be a lower bound on the conditional variance of y_i (given its predecessors). Next assume that, for every $j \leq m$ and $i \leq n$, given $(y_i)_{i \leq n}$, $(x_i^l)_{i \leq n, l < j}$,

¹⁹We are unaware of a statement of a result that directly implies this one, though there are many results about optimal bandwidth that are similar in spirit.

and $(x_i^j)_{k < i}$, x_i^j is drawn from a continuous distribution on $[-K, K]$ with a continuous conditional density function g_i^j bounded below by $\eta > 0$. Thus, as in Proposition 3, we allow for a rather general class of data generating processes, where, in particular, the x 's are not constrained to be independent.²⁰ The message of the following result is that the empirical similarity is non-unique.

For such a process we can state:

Proposition 5 Let there be given $c \in (0, v/2)$. There exists $\bar{\varepsilon} > 0$ such that for all $\varepsilon \in (0, \bar{\varepsilon})$ and for every $\delta > 0$ there exists N such that for every $n \geq N$ there exists $M(n)$ such that for every $m \geq M(n)$,

$$P(\varepsilon\text{-arg min } AMSE \text{ is not connected}) \geq 1 - \delta.$$

The fact that the $\varepsilon\text{-arg min } AMSE$ is not a singleton is hardly surprising, as we allow the $AMSE$ to be ε -away from its minimal value. However, one could expect this set to be convex, as would be the case if we were considering the minimization of a convex function. This convexity would also suggest a simple follow-the-gradient algorithm to find a global minimum of the $AMSE$ function. But the Proposition states that this is not the case. For $\varepsilon = 0$ we could expect $\varepsilon\text{-arg min } AMSE$ to be a singleton (hence a convex set), but as soon as $\varepsilon > 0$ we will find that there are ε -minimizers of the $AMSE$ whose convex combinations need not be ε -minimizers. Clearly, this is possible because our result is asymptotic: given ε we let n , and then $m \geq M(n)$ go to infinity. But we find the present order of quantifiers to be natural: ε indicates a degree of tolerance to suboptimality, and it can be viewed as a psychological feature of the agent, as can the cost c . The pair (ε, c) can be considered as determining the agent's preferences for the accuracy and simplicity trade-off. An agent with given preferences is confronted with a

²⁰The assumption of independence of the y_i 's is only used to guarantee that each observation y_i has sufficiently close other observations, and it can therefore be significantly relaxed.

database, and we ask whether her “best” explanation of the database be unique as more data accumulate. Proposition 5 suggests that multiplicity of local optima of the similarity function is the rule when the number of variables is allowed to increase relative to that of the observations.

3.2 Complexity

Importantly, our complexity result extends to the continuous case. Formally,

Problem 2 CONTINUOUS-EMPIRICAL-SIMILARITY: Given integers $m, n \geq 1$, a database of rational valued observations, $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$, and (rational) numbers $c, R \geq 0$, is there a vector of extended rational non-negative numbers w such that $AMSE(w, c) \leq R$?

And we can state

Theorem 2 CONTINUOUS-EMPIRICAL-SIMILARITY is NPC.

As will be clear from the proof of this result, the key assumption that drives the combinatorial complexity is not that x, y or even w are binary. Rather, it is that there is a fixed cost associated with including an additional variable in the similarity function. That is, that the $AMSE$ is discontinuous at $w^j = 0$.^{21,22}

To conclude, it appears that the qualitative conclusion, namely that people may have the same database of cases yet come up with different “empirical similarity” functions to explain it, would hold also in a continuous model.

²¹To see that this complexity result does not hinge on specific values of the variables x_i^j and each y_i , one may prove an analogous result for a problem in which positive-length ranges of values are given for these variables, where the question is whether a certain $AMSE$ can be obtained for some values in these ranges.

²²See also Eilat (2007), who finds that the fixed cost for including a variable is the main driving force behind the complexity of finding an optimal set of predictors in a regression problem (as in Aragonés et al., 2005).

4 Discussion

4.1 Learnability

Our analysis seems to suggest that some processes are inherently learnable, and some aren't. In both models we find that, if y is a function of $x = (x^j)_{j \leq m}$ and m is not too large, whereas the number n of i.i.d. observations can grow at will, then the functional relationship can be learnt. As a by-product, this learning will result in different agents coming up with the same beliefs and predictions. By contrast, if n is limited and m can be relatively large, there is no basic process that can be learnt, and different people may end up with different opinions.

There are two distinctions between the extreme cases discussed above: first, the relative sizes of n and m . Secondly, the assumption that the observations are i.i.d. draws from a basic functional relationship between y and x . When we compare prediction in the insurance and in the revolution problems, the two distinctions are extreme: (i) in the insurance problem one can think of many cases (large n) for a limited set of predictors (small m), whereas the opposite holds when dealing with revolutions; (ii) in the insurance problem causal independent across observations is a reasonable working assumption, while it does not appear to be valid in studying revolutions.

We observe that these two distinctions are intertwined: in case consecutive observations are causally related, one may introduce the relevant part of a problem's history as part of the predictors (as is done in autoregression models). For example, if we believe that the financial crisis of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression had a causal effect on the way that the financial crisis of 2007/8 was handled, we can introduce a predictor "post-1929", and expect it to be a sufficient statistic for history, as it were. Thus, causal relationships between consecutive observations can, in principle, be reduced to the question of the relative sizes of m and n .

Our discussion is silent on the question of experimentation. We provide

results about learnable processes where the observations are i.i.d., with a given distribution of the predictors. In the classical view of scientific inquiry, however, the predictors are not randomly drawn; rather, researchers may design controlled experiments and choose values of x so as to study causal mechanisms. One can therefore distinguish among three types of set-ups:

(i) There exists a basic functional relationship, $y = f(x)$, where one may obtain observations of y for any x one chooses to experiment with;

(ii) There exists a basic functional relationship, $y = f(x)$, and one may obtain i.i.d. observations (x, y) , but can't control the observed x 's;

(iii) There is no bounded set of variables x such that y_i depends only on x_i , independently of past values.

Set-up (i) is the gold standard of scientific studies. It allows testing hypotheses, distinguishing among competing theories and so forth. However, many problems in fields such as education or medicine are closer to set-up (ii). In these problems one cannot always run controlled experiments, be it due to the cost of the experiments, their duration, or the ethical problems involved. Still, standard results in statistics, of which Propositions 2 and 4 are examples, suggest that learning is still possible: the values of the function f would be predicted with high accuracy for all the x 's that one normally observed. Some variables may not be identifiable, so that prediction for yet-unobserved variable value combinations may leave room for disagreement. But, as long as the observations are drawn from the same distribution, agreement about them is likely to be the rule. Finally, there are problems that are closer to set-up (iii). The rise and fall of economic empires, the ebb and flow of religious sentiments, social norms and ideologies are all phenomena that affect economic predictions, yet do not belong to problems of types (i) or (ii). In these types of problems, disagreement among rational agents need not be anomalous.

4.2 Higher-Order Induction Processes

Second-order processes raise questions about yet higher order processes of the same nature, and the possibility of infinite regress. The question then arises, why do we focus on second-order induction and do not climb up the hierarchy of higher-order inductive processes? Higher order induction can indeed be defined in the context of our model. Our notion of second-order induction consists of learning the similarity function from the database of observation. One may well ask, could this learning process be improved upon? For example, we have been using a leave-one-out technique. But the literature suggests also other methods, such as k -fold cross-validation, in which approximately $1/k$ of the database is taken out each time, and their y values are estimated by the remaining observations. One can consider, for a given database, the choice of an optimal k , or compare these methods to bootstrap methods (see, for instance, Kohavi, 1995). Similarly, kernel methods can be compared to nearest-neighbor methods (Fix and Hodges, 1951, 1952). In short, the process we assume in this paper, of second-order induction, can itself be learnt by what might be called third-order induction, and an infinite regress can be imagined. Isn't restricting attention to second-order induction somewhat arbitrary? Is it a result of bounded rationality?

A few comments are in order. First, in some types of applications lower orders may provide good approximations. For example, suppose that it is indeed the case that $y = f(x)$ as in Propositions 2 and 4. Zero-order induction may refer to the assumption that there is nothing to be learnt from the past about the future, or, at least, that the x variables contain no relevant information. This would surely lead to poor predictions as compared to the learnable process ($y = f(x)$). First-order induction would be using a fixed similarity function to predict y based on its past values. This would provide much better estimates, though also systematic biases (in particular, near the boundaries of the domain of x). Thus, second-order induction is needed, which, in particular, leads to higher weights, and "tighter" similar-

ity functions for large n . This is basically the message of Propositions 2 and 4: similarly to decreasing the bandwidth of the Nadaraya-Watson estimator when n increases, computing the empirical similarity leads (with very high probability) to convergence of the estimator to $y_p = f(x_p)$. Third-order induction could improve these results, say, by making the rate of convergence faster. But it is not needed for the conceptual message of Propositions 2 and 4, and, importantly, of Propositions 3 and 5: for a small m and increasing n we can expect learning to occur, and agreement to result, whereas neither is guaranteed when m is large relative to n . Thus, the marginal contribution of higher orders of induction, in terms of the conceptual import of our results, seems limited.

Second, our model can also be applied to strategic set-ups, such as equilibrium selection in coordination games. In these set-ups the data generating process is partly, or mostly about the reasoning of other agents, and being even one level behind the others may have a big effect on the accuracy of one's predictions, as well as on one's payoff. However, in such a game any reasoning method can be an equilibrium in the "meta-game", in which players select a reasoning method and then use it for predicting others' behavior. For example, players might adopt zero-order induction, assume that the past is completely irrelevant and make random selections at each period. Thus, zero-order induction can be an equilibrium of the meta-game. Similarly, first-order induction may be the selected equilibrium (as in Steiner and Stewart, 2008, Argenziano and Gilboa, 2012). Viewed thus, we suggest that second-order induction is a natural candidate for a focal point in the reasoning (meta-)game. Assuming that people do engage in this process in non-strategic set-ups, where it might lead to good predictions (as suggested by Propositions 2 and 4), we propose that in a strategic set-up second-order induction may be the equilibrium players coordinate on. Clearly, this is an empirical claim that needs to be tested. However, stopping at second-order induction doesn't involve any assumption of bounded rationality; it is only

a specific theory of focal points in the reasoning game.

Lastly, we point out that higher orders of induction may generate identification problems: since the agents in our model are assumed to learn parameters (as the parameters of the similarity function in second-order induction), one should be concerned about higher orders of induction increasing the number of parameters. Surely, it is possible that third- or even fourth-order induction would be identifiable and generate better predictions. But an infinite regress is likely to generate a model that cannot be estimated from the finite database, and the optimal choice of the order of induction in the model may follow considerations such as the Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974).

4.3 Compatibility with Bayesianism

There are several ways in which the learning process we study can relate to the Bayesian approach. First, as discussed in the Introduction, one may consider our model as describing the generation of prior beliefs, along the lines of the “small world” interpretation of the state space (as in Savage, 1954, section 5.5). In the examples discussed above this “prior” would be summarized by a single probability number, and there wouldn’t be any opportunity to perform Bayesian updating. One may develop slightly more elaborate models, in which each case would involve a few stages (say, demonstrations, reaction by the regime, siege of parliament...) and use past cases to define a prior on the multi-stage space, which can be updated after some stages have been observed. Our approach is compatible with this version of Bayesianism, where the similarity-based relative frequencies using the empirical similarity is a method of generating a prior belief over the state space.

Alternatively, one can adopt a “large world” or “grand state space” approach, in which a state of the world resolves any uncertainty from the beginning of time. Savage (1954) suggests to think of a single decision problem in one’s life, as if one were choosing a single act (strategy) upon one’s birth.

Thus, the newborn baby would need to have a prior over all she may encounter in her lifetime. For many applications one may need to consider historical cases, and thus the prior should be the hypothetical one the decision maker would have had, had she been born years back. The assumption that newborn entertain a prior probability over the entire paths their lives would take is a bit fanciful. Further, the assumption that they would have such a prior even before they could make any decisions conflicts with the presumably-behavioral foundations of subjective probability. Yet, this approach is compatible with the process we describe: in the language of such a model, ours can be described as agents having a high prior probability that the data generating process would follow the empirical similarity function. In the context of a game (such as a revolution), this would imply that they expect other players' beliefs to follow a similar process.

There are ways of implementing the Bayesian approach that are in between the small world and the large world interpretation, and these are unlikely to be compatible with our model. For example, assume that an agent believes that the successes of revolutions generates a (conditionally) i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli random variables, with an unknown parameter p . As a Bayesian statistician, she has a prior probability over p , and she observes past realizations in order to infer what p is likely to be. This Bayesian updating of the prior over p to a posterior has no reason to resemble our process of learning the similarity function.

In this paper we focus on probabilistic beliefs, or point estimates of the variable y given the x 's. In case of uniqueness of the similarity function, or at least agreement among all the empirical similarity functions, one may consider these estimates to be objective, and proceed to assume that all rational agents would share them. But in case of disagreement, one may ask whether it is rational for the agents to disagree. For example, if there are multiple similarity functions that obtain a best fit, is it rational for an agent to choose one and based her predictions on that function alone? Wouldn't it

more rational for her, assuming unbounded computational ability, to find all optimal functions and somehow take them into account in her predictions? These are valid questions which are beyond the scope of this paper.

4.4 Cases and Rules

As mentioned above, one can assume that people use rule-based, rather than case-based reasoning, and couch the discussion in the language of rules. Rules are naturally learnt from the data by a process of abduction (or case-to-rule induction), which can also be viewed as a type of second-order induction.

While the two modes of reasoning can sometimes be used to explain similar phenomena, they are in general quite different. First, sets of rules may be inconsistent, whereas this is not a concern for databases of cases. Second, association rules such as “if x_i belongs to a set..., then y_i is...” do not have a bite where their antecedent is false. Finally, association rules, which are natural for deterministic predictions, need to be augmented in order to generate probabilities.

We find case-based reasoning to be simpler for our purposes. Cases never contradict each other; their similarity-weighted relative frequency always defines a probability; and, importantly, they are a minimal generalization of simple relative frequencies that used to define objective probabilities. However, additional insights can be obtained from more general models that combine case-based and rule-based reasoning, with second-order induction processes that learn the similarity of cases as well as the applicability and accuracy of rules.

5 Appendix A: Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1:

Assume first that $j \in M$ is informative relative to $J \subseteq M \setminus \{j\}$ in $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$. Let $z \in \{0, 1\}^J$ be such that $|b(J, z \cdot 0)|, |b(J, z \cdot 1)| > 0$ and

$$\bar{y}^{(J \cdot j, z \cdot 0)} \neq \bar{y}^{(J \cdot j, z \cdot 1)}$$

Assume that B' is a t -replica of B . The main point of the proof is that, for large enough t , the MSE of a given subset of variables, L , could be approximated by a corresponding expression in which $\bar{y}_i^{(L, z')}$ (computed for the bin in which i was omitted) is replaced by $\bar{y}^{(L, z')}$ (computed for the bin without omissions), and then to use standard analysis of variance calculation to show that the introduction of an informative variable can only reduce the sum of squared errors.

Formally, let $b_t(L, z')$ denote the L - z' bin in B' (so that $|b_t(L, z')| = t|b(L, z')|$). Recall that

$$MSE(L) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{z' \in \{0, 1\}^L} \sum_{i \in b_t(L, z')} \left(\bar{y}_i^{(L, z')} - y_i \right)^2$$

and define

$$MSE'(L) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{z' \in \{0, 1\}^L} \sum_{i \in b_t(L, z')} \left(\bar{y}^{(L, z')} - y_i \right)^2.$$

It is straightforward that $\bar{y}_i^{(L, z')} - \bar{y}^{(L, z')} = O\left(\frac{1}{t}\right)$ and

$$MSE(L) - MSE'(L) = O\left(\frac{1}{t}\right). \quad (8)$$

Let us now consider the given set of variables J and $j \in M \setminus J$ that is informative relative to J . For any $z' \in \{0, 1\}^J$ we have

$$\sum_{i \in b(J, z')} \left(\bar{y}^{(J, z')} - y_i \right)^2 \geq \sum_{i \in b(J, z')} \left(\bar{y}^{(J \cdot j, z' \cdot x_i^j)} - y_i \right)^2$$

and for z (for which $\bar{y}^{(J,j,z=0)} \neq \bar{y}^{(J,j,z=1)}$ is known),

$$\sum_{i \in b(J,z)} (\bar{y}^{(J,z)} - y_i)^2 > \sum_{i \in b(J,z)} \left(\bar{y}^{(J,j,z=x_i^j)} - y_i \right)^2 + c$$

where $c > 0$ is a constant that does not depend on t . It follows that

$$MSE'(J \cup \{j\}) \leq MSE'(J) - c'$$

where $c' = \frac{|b(J,z)|}{n}c > 0$ is independent of t . This, combined with (8), means that $MSE(J \cup \{j\}) < MSE(J)$ holds for large enough t .

Conversely, if j is not informative relative to J , then it remains non-informative for any t -replica of B . If j is a function of J , then the J bins and the $J \cup \{j\}$ -bins are identical, with the same predictions and the same error terms in each, so that $MSE(J \cup \{j\}) = MSE(J)$. Assume, then, that j is not informative relative to J (for B and for any replica thereof), but that j isn't a function of J . Thus, at least one J -bin of B , and of each replica thereof, B' , is split into two $J \cup \{j\}$ -bins, but the average values of y in any two such sub-bins are identical to each other. It is therefore still true that $MSE'(J \cup \{j\}) = MSE'(J)$ because the sum of squared errors has precisely the same error expressions in both sides. However, for every set of variables L and every L -bin in which there are both $y_i = 1$ and $y_i = 0$, the error terms for that bin in $MSE(L)$ are higher than those in $MSE'(L)$: the leave-one-out technique approximates $y_i = 1$ by $\bar{y}_i^{(L,z')} < \bar{y}^{(L,z')}$ and $y_i = 0$ by $\bar{y}_i^{(L,z')} > \bar{y}^{(L,z')}$. Further the difference $\left| \bar{y}_i^{(L,z')} - \bar{y}^{(L,z')} \right|$ decreases monotonically in the bin size. Therefore, if at least one J -bin is split into two $J \cup \{j\}$ -bins, we obtain $MSE(J \cup \{j\}) > MSE(J)$. \square

Proof of Observation 1:

Consider a database obtained by $t > 1$ replications of the following ($n =$

4t, $m = 3$):

i	x_i^1	x_i^2	x_i^3	y_i
1	0	0	1	1
2	0	1	1	0
3	1	0	0	0
4	1	1	0	1

Clearly, y is a function of (x^1, x^2) . In fact, it is the exclusive-or function, that is $y = 1$ iff $x^1 = x^2$. Neither 1 nor 2 is informative relative to \emptyset , but each is informative relative to the other. (Thus, for $J \equiv \emptyset \subseteq J' \equiv \{2\}$, $j = 1$ is informative relative to J' but not relative to J .) However, 1 is not informative relative to $J'' = \{2, 3\}$ (while it is relative to its subset J').

To see that the latter can happen also when the variable in question isn't a function of the other ones, consider the following example. Consider $n = 15, m = 2$:

i	x_i^1	x_i^2	y_i
1	0	0	0
2	0	0	1
3-6	0	1	0
7-8	0	1	1
9-10	1	0	0
11-12	1	0	1
13-14	1	1	0
15	1	1	1

It can be verified that x^1 is informative relative to \emptyset but not relative to $\{2\}$.

□

Proof of Proposition 2:

Assume a data generating process (g, f) for which all $j \in M$ are informative. For a given $j \in M$ there exists $z^{-j} \in \{0, 1\}^{m-1}$ such that $f(z^{-j} \cdot 0) \neq f(z^{-j} \cdot 1)$ (hence $[f(z^{-j} \cdot 0) - f(z^{-j} \cdot 1)]^2 = 1$) and $g(z^{-j} \cdot 0), g(z^{-j} \cdot 1) > 0$. Consider a proper subset of predictors, $J \subsetneq M$, and let $j \notin J$. Assume that n is large. Focus on an observation i whose x_i is in the bin defined by $z^{-j} \cdot 0$, and consider its estimated \bar{y}_i . In the computation of the latter (according to J , which does not include j) there are observations x_k in the

bin defined by $z^{-j} \cdot 1$, and they contribute 1 to the sum of squared errors. Clearly, the opposite is true as well. Hence, focusing on these bins alone we find a lower bound of the sum of squared errors $\sum_{i=1}^n (\bar{y}_i^s - y_i)^2$ that is of the order of magnitude of $2ng(z^{-j} \cdot 0)g(z^{-j} \cdot 1)$. (We skip the standard approximation argument as in the proof of Proposition 1.)

For large enough n , we can therefore conclude that with arbitrarily high probability we have

$$MSE(J) - MSE(J \cup \{j\}) > g(z^{-j} \cdot 0)g(z^{-j} \cdot 1)$$

for every $J \subseteq M \setminus \{j\}$. Observe that there are finitely many bins, and therefore, for a given $\delta > 0$ one can find N such that for every $n \geq N$

$$P\left(\begin{array}{c} MSE(J) - MSE(J \cup \{j\}) > g(z^{-j} \cdot 0)g(z^{-j} \cdot 1) \\ \forall j \in M, \forall J \subseteq M \setminus \{j\} \end{array}\right) \geq 1 - \delta. \quad (9)$$

We now turn to select a value $\bar{c} > 0$ that would be small enough so that the reduction in the *AMSE* thanks to omitting a variable j would not be worth the increase due to the error. For each j , let

$$d_j = \max \{ g(z^{-j} \cdot 0)g(z^{-j} \cdot 1) \mid z^{-j} \in \{0, 1\}^{m-1} \quad f(z^{-j} \cdot 0) \neq f(z^{-j} \cdot 1) \}$$

and

$$d \equiv \min_{j \in M} d_j.$$

Note that $d_j > 0$ for all j (as each j is informative), and hence $d > 0$. Set $\bar{c} = d/2$.

Given $\delta > 0$ let N be such that for every $n \geq N$ (9) holds. Let $c \in (0, \bar{c})$. We know that $MSE(M) = 0$ and $AMSE(M) = mc$. By the choice of \bar{c} , $\arg \min_{J \subseteq M} AMSE(J, c) = \{M\}$. Hence for any $\delta > 0$ there exists N such that for every $n \geq N$

$$P\left(\arg \min_{J \subseteq M} AMSE(J, c) = \{M\}\right) \geq 1 - \delta.$$

□

Proof of Proposition 3:

As there are at least two observations with the value of $y_i = 0$ and at least two with $y_i = 1$, if there is a variable j such that $x_i^j = y_i$ (or $x_i^j = 1 - y_i$) for all $i \leq n$, the set $J = \{j\}$ obtains $MSE(J) = 0$ (and $AMSE(J) = c$). We will show that the proposition holds for J and J' that are (distinct) singletons.

Let the variables be generated according to the process described with $0 < \eta < 0.5$. Each x^j has a probability of equalling y that is at least η^n . The probability it does *not* provide a perfect fit is bounded above by $(1 - \eta^n) < 1 - \eta^n$ – which is a common bound across all possible realizations of previously observed variables. The probability that none of m such consecutively drawn variables provides a perfect fit is bounded above by $(1 - \eta^n)^m \rightarrow 0$ as $m \rightarrow \infty$. Similarly if we consider $m = 2k$ variables, and ask what is the probability that there is at least one among the first k and at least one among the second k such that each provides a perfect fit ($x_i^j = y_i$ for all i) is at least $[1 - (1 - \eta^n)^m]^2 \rightarrow 1$ as $m \rightarrow \infty$. \square

Proof of Theorem 1:

Clearly, EMPIRICAL-SIMILARITY is in NP. Given a set of variable indices, $J \subseteq M \equiv \{1, \dots, m\}$, computing its AMSE takes no more than $O(n^2m)$ steps.

The proof is by reduction of the SET-COVER problem to EMPIRICAL-SIMILARITY. The former, which is known to be NPC (see Garey and Johnson, 1979), is defined as

Problem 3 SET-COVER: Given a set P , $r \geq 1$ subsets thereof, $T_1, \dots, T_r \subseteq P$, and an integer k ($1 \leq k \leq r$), are there k of the subsets that cover P ? (That is, are there indices $1 \leq i_1 \leq i_2 \leq \dots \leq i_k \leq r$ such that $\cup_{j=1}^k T_{i_j} = P$?)

Given an instance of SET-COVER, we construct, in polynomial time, an instance of EMPIRICAL-SIMILARITY such that the former has a set cover iff the latter has a similarity function that obtains the desired AMSE. Let there be given P , $r \geq 1$ subsets thereof, $T_1, \dots, T_r \subseteq P$, and an integer k .

Assume without loss of generality that $P = \{1, \dots, p\}$, that $\cup_{i \leq r} T_i = P$, and that $z_{uv} \in \{0, 1\}$ is the incidence matrix of the subsets, that is, that for $u \leq p$ and $v \leq r$, $z_{uv} = 1$ iff $u \in T_v$.

Let $n = 2(p + 1)$ and $m = r$. Define the database $B = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \leq n}$ as follows. (In the database each observation is repeated twice to avoid bins of size 1.)

For $u \leq p$ define two observations, $i = 2u - 1, 2u$ by

$$x_i^j = z_{uj} \quad y_i = 1$$

and add two more observations, $i = 2p + 1, 2p + 2$ defined by

$$x_i^j = 0 \quad y_i = 0.$$

Next, choose c to be such that $0 < c < \frac{1}{mn^3}$, say, $c = (mn^3)^{-1} / 2$ and $R = kc$. This construction can obviously be done in polynomial time.

We claim that there is a cover of size k of P iff there is a similarity function defined by a subset $J \subseteq M \equiv \{1, \dots, m\}$ such that $AMSE(J, c) \leq R$. Let us begin with the “only if” direction. Assume, then, that such a cover exists. Let J be the indices $1 \leq i_1 \leq i_2 \leq \dots \leq i_k \leq r = m$ of the cover. For every $i \leq 2p$, there exists $j \in J$ such that $x_i^j = 1$ and thus i is not in the same bin as $2p + 1, 2p + 2$. It follows that for every i' such that $s_{wJ}(x_i, x_{i'}) = 1$ we have $y_{i'} = y_i = 1$ and thus $\bar{y}_i^{s_{wJ}} = 1 = y_i$. Similarly, for $i = 2p + 1$ and $i' = 2p + 2$ are similar only to each other and there we also obtain perfect prediction: $\bar{y}_i^{s_{wJ}} = 0 = y_i$. To conclude, $SSE(J) = MSE(J) = 0$. Thus, $AMSE(J, c) = MSE(J) + c|J| = ck = R$.

Conversely, assume that $J \subseteq M \equiv \{1, \dots, m\}$ is such that $AMSE(J, c) \leq R$. We argue that we have to have $SSE(J) = MSE(J) = 0$. To see this, assume, to the contrary, that J does not provide a perfect fit. Thus, there exists i such that $\bar{y}_i^{s_{wJ}} \neq y_i$. As $y_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\bar{y}_i^{s_{wJ}}$ is a relative frequency in a bin of size no greater than n , the error $|\bar{y}_i^{s_{wJ}} - y_i|$ must be at least $\frac{1}{n}$. Therefore, $SSE(J) \geq \frac{1}{n^2}$ and $MSE(J) \geq \frac{1}{n^3}$. However, $R = ck \leq cm$ and

as $c < \frac{1}{mn^3}$ as we have $cm < \frac{1}{n^3}$. Hence $MSE(J) \geq \frac{1}{n^3} > cm \geq R$, that is, $MSE(J) > R$ and $AMSE(J, c) > R$ follows, a contradiction.

It follows that, if J obtains a low enough AMSE ($AMSE(J, c) \leq R$), it obtains a perfect fit. This is possible only if within each J -bin the values of y_i 's are constant. In particular, the observations $i = 2p + 1$ and $i' = 2p + 2$ (which, being identical are obviously in the same bin) are not similar to any other. That is, for every $i \leq 2p$ we must have $s_{w_J}(x_i, x_{2p+1}) = 0$. This, in turn, means that for every such i there is a $j \in J$ such that $x_i^j \neq x_{2p+1}^j$. But $x_{2p+1}^j = 0$ so this means that $x_i^j = 1$. Hence, for every $u \leq p$ there is a $j \in J$ such that $x_{2u}^j = z_{uj} = 1$, that is, $\{T_v\}_{v \in J}$ is a cover of P . It only remains to note that $AMSE(J, c) \leq R$ implies that $|J| \leq k$. \square

Proof of Observation 2:

Assume that $m = 1$, $n = 4$ and

i	x_i	y_i
1	0	0
2	1	0
3	3	1
4	4	1

In this example observations 1, 2 are closer to each other than each is to any of observations 3, 4 and vice versa. (That is, $|x_i - x_j| = 1$ for $i = 1, j = 2$ as well as for $i = 3, j = 4$, but $|x_i - x_j| \geq 2$ for $i \leq 2 < j$.) Moreover the values of y are the same for the “close” observations and different for “distant” ones. (That is, $y_i = y_j$ for $i = 1, j = 2$ as well as for $i = 3, j = 4$, but $|y_i - y_j| = 1$ for $i \leq 2 < j$.) If we choose a finite w , the estimated value for each i , \bar{y}_i^{sw} , is a weighted average of the two distant observations and the single close one. In particular, for every $w < \infty$ we have $MSE(w) > 0$.

Observe that $w = w^1 = \infty$ doesn't provide a perfect fit either: if we set $w = w^1 = \infty$, each observation i is considered to be dissimilar to any other, and its y value is estimated to be the default value, $\bar{y}_i^{sw} = y_0$. Regardless of the (arbitrary) choice of y_0 , the MSE is bounded below by that obtained for

$y = 0.5$ (which is the average y in the entire database). Thus, $MSE(\infty) \geq 0.25$.

Thus, $MSE(w) > 0$ for all $w \in [0, \infty]$. However, as $w \rightarrow \infty$ (but $w < \infty$), for each i the weight of the observation that is closest to i converges to 1 (and the weights of the distant ones – to zero), so that $\bar{y}_i^{s^w} \rightarrow y_i$. Hence, $MSE(w) \rightarrow_{w \rightarrow \infty} 0$. We thus conclude that $\inf_{w \in [0, \infty]} MSE(w) = 0$ but that there is no w that minimizes the MSE . \square

Proof of Proposition 4:

We wish to show that arbitrarily low values of the MSE can be obtained with probability that is arbitrarily close to 1. Let there be given $\nu > 0$ and $\xi > 0$. We wish to find N_0 and W_0 such that for every $n \geq N_0$, the vector w_0 defined by $w_0^j = W_0$ satisfies

$$P(MSE(w_0) < \nu) \geq 1 - \xi.$$

To this end, we first wish to define “proximity” of the x values that would guarantee “proximity” of the y values. Suppose that the latter is defined by $\nu/2$. As the function f is continuous on a compact set, it is uniformly continuous. Hence, there exists $\theta > 0$ such that, for any x, x' that satisfy $\|x - x'\| < \theta$ we have $[f(x) - f(x')]^2 < \nu/2$. Let us divide the set X into $(4K\sqrt{m}/\theta)^m$ equi-volume cubes, each with an edge of length $\frac{\theta}{2\sqrt{m}}$. Two points x, x' that belong to the same cube differ by at most $\frac{\theta}{2\sqrt{m}}$ in each coordinate and thus satisfy $\|x - x'\| < \theta/2$. Let us now choose N_1 such that, with probability of at least $(1 - \xi/2)$, each such cube contains at least two observations x_i ($i \leq N_1$). This guarantees that, when observation i is taken out of the sample, there is another observation i' (in the same cube), with $[y_{i'} - f(x_i)]^2 < \nu/2$.

Next, we wish to bound the probability mass of each cube (defined by g). The volume of a cube is $\left(\frac{\theta}{2\sqrt{m}}\right)^m$ and the density function is bounded from below by η . Thus, the proportion of observations in the cube (out of all the n observations) converges (as $n \rightarrow \infty$) to a number that is bounded from

below by $\zeta \equiv \eta \left(\frac{\theta}{2\sqrt{m}} \right)^m > 0$. Choose $N_0 \geq N_1$ such that, with probability of at least $(1 - \xi/2)$, for each $n \geq N_0$ the proportion of the observations in the cube is at least $\zeta/2$. Note that this is a positive number which is independent of n .

Finally, we turn to choose W_0 . For each i , the proportion of observations x_k with $[f(x_i) - f(x_k)]^2 > \nu$ is bounded above by $(1 - \zeta)$. Define w_0 by $w_0^j = W_0$. Observe that, as $W_0 \rightarrow \infty$,

$$\frac{\sum_{k \neq i, [f(x_i) - f(x_k)]^2 > \nu} s(x_i, x_k)}{\sum_{k \neq i, [f(x_i) - f(x_k)]^2 \leq \nu} s(x_i, x_k)} \rightarrow 0$$

and this convergence is uniform in n (as the definition of ζ is independent of n). Thus a sufficiently high W_0 can be found so that, for all $n \geq N_0$, $MSE(w_0) < \nu$ with probability $(1 - \xi)$ or higher. \square

Proof of Proposition 5:

The general idea of the proof is very similar to that of Proposition 3: non-uniqueness is obtained by showing that two variables can each provide perfect fit on their own. In the continuous case, however, to obtain perfect fit one needs a bit more than in the binary case: in the latter, it was sufficient to assume that there are at least two observations with $y_i = 0$ and two with $y_i = 1$; in the continuous case we need to make sure that each y_i has a close enough y_k . For this reason, we state and prove the result for a large n ; yet, $M(n)$ will be larger still, so that we should think of this case as $m \gg n$.

We now turn to prove the result formally. It will be convenient to define, for $w \in [0, \infty]^m$, $supp(w) = \{ l \in M \mid w^l > 0 \}$.

Let there be given $c > 0$. Choose $\bar{\varepsilon} = c/3$. We wish it to be the case that if $MSE(w) \leq \varepsilon$ with $\#supp(w) = 1$, then $w \in \varepsilon\text{-arg min } AMSE$, but for no $w \in \varepsilon\text{-arg min } AMSE$ is it the case that $\#supp(w) > 1$. Clearly, the choice $\bar{\varepsilon} = c/3$ guarantees that for every $\varepsilon \in (0, \bar{\varepsilon})$, the second part of the claim holds: if a vector w satisfies $MSE(w) \leq \varepsilon$, no further reduction in the MSE can justify the cost of additional variables, which is at least

c. Conversely, because $c < v/2$ (the variance of y), a single variable j that obtains a near-zero MSE would have a lower $AMSE$ than the empty set.

Let there now be given $\varepsilon \in (0, \bar{\varepsilon})$ and every $\delta > 0$. We need to find N and, for every $n \geq N$, $M(n)$, such that for every $n \geq N$ and $m \geq M(n)$,

$$P(\varepsilon\text{-arg min } AMSE \text{ is not connected}) \geq 1 - \delta.$$

Let N be large enough so that, with probability $(1 - \delta/2)$, for all $n \geq N$,

$$\max_i \min_{k \neq i} [y_i - y_k] < \varepsilon/2.$$

(To see that such an n can be found, one may divide the $[-K, K]$ interval of values to intervals of length $\varepsilon/2$ and choose N to be large enough so that, with the desired probability, there are at least two observations in each such interval.)

Given such $n \geq N$ and the realizations of $(y_i)_{i \leq n}$, consider the realizations of x^j . Assume that, for some j , it so happens that $|x_i^j - y_i| < \varepsilon/4$ for all $i \leq n$. In this case, by setting w^j to be sufficiently high, and $w^l = 0$ for $l \neq j$, one would obtain $MSE(w) \leq \varepsilon$ and $AMSE(w) \leq \varepsilon + c$.²³ For each j , however, the probability that this will be the case is bounded below by some $\xi > 0$, independent of n and j . Let $M_1(n)$ be a number such that, for any $m \geq M_1(n)$, the probability that at least one such j satisfies $|x_i^j - y_i| < \varepsilon/4$ is $(1 - \delta/4)$, and let $M(n) > M_1(n)$ be a number such that, for any $m \geq M(n)$, the probability that at least one more such $j' > j$ satisfies $|x_i^{j'} - y_i| < \varepsilon/4$ is $(1 - \delta/8)$.

Thus, for every $n \geq N$, and every $m \geq M(n)$, with probability $1 - \delta$ there are two vectors, w^j with support $\{j\}$ and $w^{j'}$ with support $\{j'\}$, each of which obtaining $MSE(w) \leq \varepsilon$ and thus, both belonging to $\varepsilon\text{-arg min } AMSE$. To see that in this case the $\varepsilon\text{-arg min } AMSE$ is not connected, it suffices to note

²³The fact that x_i^j is close to y_i is immaterial, of course, as the variables x_i^j are not used to predict y_i directly, but only to identify the y_k that would. If x_i^j is close to some monotone function of y_i the same argument would apply.

that no w with support greater than a singleton, nor a w with an empty support (that is, $w \equiv 0$) can be in the ε -arg min $AMSE$. \square

Proof of Theorem 2:

We first verify that the problem is in NP. Given a database and a vector of extended rational weights $w^j \in [0, \infty]$, the calculation of the $AMSE$ takes $O(n^2m)$ steps as in the proof of Theorem 1. Specifically, the calculation of the similarity function $s(x, x')$ is done by first checking whether there exists a j such that $w^j = \infty$ and $x^j \neq x'^j$ (in which case $s(x, x')$ is set to 0), and, if not – by ignoring the j 's for which $w^j = \infty$.

The proof that it is NPC is basically the same as that of Theorem 1, and we use the same notation here. That is, we assume a given instance of SET-COVER: P , $r \geq 1$ subsets thereof, $T_1, \dots, T_r \subseteq P$, and an integer k , with $P = \{1, \dots, p\}$, $\cup_{i \leq r} T_i = P$, and the incidence matrix $z_{uw} \in \{0, 1\}$. We let $n = 2(p + 1)$ and $m = r$, and, for $u \leq p$, $i = 2u - 1, 2u$ is given by $x_i^j = z'_{uj}, y_i = 1$ whereas for $i = 2p + 1, 2p + 2$, $x_i^j = 0$ and $y_i = 0$. We again set $c = (mn^3)^{-1}/2$ and $R = kc$. This construction can obviously be done in polynomial time.

We claim that there exists a vector w with $AMSE(w, c) \leq R$ iff a cover of size k exists for the given instance of SET-COVER.²⁴ For the “if” part, assume that such a cover exists, corresponding to $J \subseteq M$. Setting the weights

$$w^j = \begin{cases} \infty & j \in J \\ 0 & j \notin J \end{cases}$$

one obtains $AMSE(w, c) \leq R$.

Conversely, for the “only if” part, assume that a vector of rational weights $w = (w^j)_j$ ($w^j \in [0, \infty]$) obtains $AMSE(w, c) \leq R$. Let $J \subseteq M$ be the set of indices of predictors that have a positive w^j (∞ included). By the definition

²⁴This proof uses values of x and of y that are in $\{0, 1\}$. However, if we consider the same problem in which the input is restricted to be positive-length ranges of the variables, one can prove a similar result with sufficiently small ranges and a value of R that is accordingly adjusted.

of R (as equal to ck), it has to be the case that $|J| \leq k$. We argue that J defines a cover (that is, that $\{T_v\}_{v \in J}$ is a cover of P).

Observe that, if we knew that $|J| = k$, the inequality

$$AMSE(w, c) = MSE(w) + c|J| \leq R = ck$$

could only hold if $MSE(w) = 0$, from which it would follow that w provides a perfect fit. In particular, for every $i \leq 2p$ there exists $j \in J$ such that $x_i^j \neq x_{2p+1}^j$ that is, $x_i^j = 1$, and J defines a cover of P .

However, it is still possible that $|J| < k$ and $0 < MSE(w) \leq c(k - |J|)$. Yet, even in this case, J defines a cover. To see this, assume that this is not the case. Then, as in the proof of Theorem 1, there exists $i \leq 2p$ such that for all j , either $w^j = 0$ ($j \notin J$) or $x_i^j = 0 = x_{2p+1}^j$. This means that $s(x_i, x_{2p+1}) = s(x_i, x_{2p+2}) = 1$. In particular, $y_{2p+1} = y_{2p+2} = 0$ take part (with positive weights) in the computation of $\bar{y}_i^{s_w}$ and we have $\bar{y}_i^{s_w} < 1 = y_i$. In the proof of Theorem 1 this sufficed to bound the error $|\bar{y}_i^{s_w} - y_i|$ from below by $\frac{1}{n}$, as all observations with positive weights had the same weights. This is no longer the case here. However, the cases $2p+1, 2p+2$ obtain maximal similarity to i ($s(x_i, x_{2p+1}) = s(x_i, x_{2p+2}) = 1$), because $x_{2p+1}^j = x_{2p+2}^j = x_i^j (= 0)$ for all j with $w^j > 0$. (It is possible that for other observations $l \leq 2p$ we have $s(x_i, x_{2p+1}) \in (0, 1)$, which was ruled out in the binary case. But the weights of these observations are evidently smaller than that of $2p+1, 2p+2$.) Thus we obtain (again) that the error $|\bar{y}_i^{s_w} - y_i|$ must be at least $\frac{1}{n}$, from which $SSE(w) \geq \frac{1}{n^2}$ and $MSE(w) \geq \frac{1}{n^3}$ follow. This implies $AMSE(w, c) > R$ and concludes the proof. \square

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