

Fact-Free Learning

By ENRIQUETA ARAGONES, ITZHAK GILBOA, ANDREW POSTLEWAITE, AND
DAVID SCHMEIDLER*

People may be surprised to notice certain regularities that hold in existing knowledge they have had for some time. That is, they may learn without getting new factual information. We argue that this can be partly explained by computational complexity. We show that, given a knowledge base, finding a small set of variables that obtain a certain value of R^2 is computationally hard, in the sense that this term is used in computer science. We discuss some of the implications of this result and of fact-free learning in general. (JEL D83)

The process of induction is the process of assuming the simplest law that can be made to harmonize with our experience.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922)

Understanding one's social environment requires accumulating information and finding

* Aragones: Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC, Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain 08193 (e-mail: enriqueta.aragones@uab.es); Gilboa: School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 69978 and Cowles Foundation, Yale University (e-mail: igilboa@tau.ac.il); Postlewaite: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail: apostlew@econ.sas.upenn.edu); Schmeidler: Department of Statistics, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, Israel 69978 and The Ohio State University (e-mail: schmeid@tau.ac.il.). Earlier versions of this paper circulated under the titles "From Cases to Rules: Induction and Regression" and "Accuracy versus Simplicity: A Complex Trade-Off." We have benefited greatly from comments and references by the editor, an anonymous referee, Yoav Benjamini, Joe Halpern, Offer Lieberman, Bart Lipman, Yishay Mansour, Nimrod Megiddo, Dov Samet, Petra Todd, and Ken Wolpin, as well as the participants of the SITE conference on Behavioral Economics at Stanford, August 2003, and the Cowles Foundation workshop on Complexity in Economic Theory at Yale, September 2003. Aragones acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, Grant SEC2003-01961, and CREA-Barcelona Economics. Aragones, Gilboa, and Schmeidler gratefully acknowledge support from the Polarization and Conflict Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. Gilboa and Schmeidler gratefully acknowledge support from the Israel Science Foundation (Grant 790/00 and 975/03). Postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9810693.

regularities in that information. Many theoretical models of learning focus on learning new facts, on their integration in an existing knowledge base, and on the way they modify beliefs. Within the Bayesian framework, the integration of new facts and the modification of beliefs is done mechanically according to Bayes's rule. Much of human learning, however, has to do with making observations and finding regularities that, in principle, could have been determined using existing knowledge, rather than with the acquisition of new facts.

Consider technological innovations. In many cases, the main idea of an innovation involves combining well-known facts. For instance, putting wheels at the bottom of a suitcase allows it to roll easily. This idea was quite original when it was first introduced. But, since it only selected and combined facts that everyone had already known, it appears obvious in hindsight. It takes originality to come up with such an idea, but no particular expertise is needed to judge its value. This phenomenon is so pervasive that it has been canonized in literature: Sherlock Holmes regularly explains how the combination of a variety of clues leads inexorably to a particular conclusion, following which Watson exclaims, "Of course!"

To consider an even more extreme case, assume that an individual follows a mathematical proof of a theorem. In order to check the proof, one need not resort to the knowledge of facts. The knowledge that the agent acquires in the process has always been, in principle, available to her. Yet, mathematics has to be studied. In

fact, it is an entire discipline based solely on fact-free learning.

In this paper we focus on a particular type of fact-free learning. We consider an agent who has access to a database, involving many variables and many observations. The agent attempts to find regularities in the database. We model this learning problem and explain the difficulty in solving it optimally.¹

The immediate consequence of this difficulty is that individuals typically will not discover all the regularities in their knowledge base, and may overlook the most useful regularities. Two people with the same knowledge base may notice different regularities, and may consequently hold different views about a particular issue. One person may change the beliefs and actions of another without communicating new facts, but simply by pointing to a regularity overlooked by the other person. On the other hand, people may agree to disagree even if they have the same knowledge base and are communicating. We elaborate on these consequences in Section III.

For illustration, consider the following example.

Ann: "Russia is a dangerous country."

Bob: "Nonsense."

Ann: "Don't you think that Russia might initiate a war against a Western country?"

Bob: "Not a chance."

Ann: "Well, I believe it very well might."

Bob: "Can you come up with examples of wars that erupted between two democratic countries?"

Ann: "I guess so. Let me see ... How about England and the United States in 1812?"

Bob: "OK, save colonial wars."

Ann: "Well, then, let's see. OK, maybe you have a point. Perhaps Russia is not so dangerous."

Bob seems to have managed to change Ann's views without providing Ann with any new factual information. Rather, he pointed out a regularity in Ann's knowledge base of which

she had been unaware: democratic countries have seldom waged war on each other.²

It is likely that Ann failed to notice that the democratic peace phenomenon holds in her own knowledge base simply because it had not occurred to her to categorize wars by the type of regime of the countries involved. For most people, wars are categorized, or "indexed," by chronology and geography, but not by regime. Once the variable "type of regime" is introduced, Ann will be able to reorganize her knowledge base and observe the regularity she had failed to notice earlier.

Fact-free learning is not always due to the introduction of a new variable, or a categorization that the individual has not been aware of. Often, one may be aware of all variables involved, and yet fail to see a regularity that involves a *combination* of such variables. Consider an econometrician who wants to understand the determinants of the rate of economic growth. She has access to a large database of realized growth rates for particular economies that includes a plethora of variables describing these economies in detail.³ Assume that the econometrician prefers fewer explanatory variables to more. Her main difficulty is to determine what set of variables to use in her regression.

We can formalize her problem as determining whether there exists a set of k regressors that gives a particular level of R^2 . This is a well-defined problem that can be relegated to computer software. However, testing all subsets of k regressors out of, say, m variables involves running $\binom{m}{k} = O(m^k)$ regressions. When m and k are of realistic magnitude, it is impractical to perform this exhaustive search. For instance, choosing the best set of $k = 13$ regressors out of $m = 100$ potentially relevant variables involves

² In the field of international relations, this is referred to as the "democratic peace phenomenon." (See, e.g., Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 1993.)

³ As an example of the variety of variables that may potentially be relevant, consider the following quote from a recent paper by Raphael La Porta et al. (1998) on the quality of government: "We find that countries that are poor, close to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use French or socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance."

¹ Herbert Simon (1955) argued a half century ago for incorporation of "the physiological and psychological limitations" in models of decision making.

$\binom{100}{13} \approx 7 * 10^{15}$ regressions. On a computer that can perform 10 million regression analyses per second, this task would take more than twenty-two years.

Linear regression is a structured and relatively well-understood problem, and one may hope that, using clever algorithms that employ statistical analysis, the best set of k regressors can be found without actually testing all $\binom{m}{k}$ subsets. Our main result is that this is not the case. Formally, we prove that finding whether k regressors can obtain a prespecified value of R^2 , r , is, in the language of computer science, NP-Complete.⁴ Moreover, we show that this problem is hard (NP-Complete) for every positive value of r . Thus, our regression problem belongs to a large family of combinatorial problems for which no efficient (polynomial) algorithm is known. An implication of this result is that, even for moderate size datasets, it will generally be impossible to know the trade-off between increasing the number of regressors and increasing the explanatory power of those regressors.⁵

Our interest is not in the problem econometricians face, but in the problems encountered by nonspecialists attempting to understand their environment. That is, we wish to model the reasoning of standard economic agents, rather than of economists analyzing data. We contend, however, that a problem that is difficult to solve for a working economist will also be difficult for an economic agent. If an econometrician cannot be guaranteed to find the “best” set of regressors, many economic agents may also fail to identify important relationships in their personal knowledge base.⁶

Neither economic agents nor social scientists typically look for the best set of regressors without any guiding principle. Rather than engaging in data mining, they espouse and develop various theories that guide their search for regularities. Our econometrician will often have

some idea about which variables may be conducive to growth. She therefore need not exhaust all subsets of k regressors in her quest for the “best” regression. Our model does not capture the development of and selection among causal theories, but even the set of variables potentially relevant to our econometrician’s theory is typically large enough to raise computational difficulties. More importantly, if the econometrician wants to test her scientific paradigm, and if she wants to guarantee that she is not missing some important regularities that lie outside her paradigm, she cannot restrict attention to the regressors she has already focused on.

While computational complexity is not the only reason why individuals may be surprised to discover regularities in their own knowledge bases, it is one of the reasons that knowledge of facts does not imply knowledge of all their implications. Hence, computational complexity, alongside unawareness, makes fact-free learning a common phenomenon.

In Section I, we lay out our model and discuss several notions of regularities and the criteria to choose among them. The difficulty of discovering satisfactory sets of regressors is proven in Section II. In the last section, we discuss the results, their implications, and related literature.

I. Regularities in a Knowledge Base

An individual’s knowledge base consists of her observations and past experiences, as well as observations related to her by others. We will assume that observations are represented as vectors of numbers. An entry in the vector might be the value of a certain numerical variable, or a measure of the degree to which the observation has a particular attribute. Thus, we model the information available to an individual as a knowledge base consisting of a matrix of numbers where rows correspond to observations (distinct pieces of information) and columns to attributes.

We show below a fraction of a conceivable knowledge base pertinent to the democratic peace example. The value in a given entry represents the degree to which the attribute

⁴ In Section II, we explain the concept of NP-Completeness and provide references to formal definitions.

⁵ In particular, principle components analysis, which finds a set of orthogonal components, is not guaranteed to find the best combination of predictors (with unconstrained correlations).

⁶ We discuss this further in Section III.

Observation	M_1	M_2	D_1	D_2	T	W
World War II ⁷	0.7	1	1	0	0	1
Cuban Missile Crisis	1	1	1	0	1	0
1991 Gulf War	1	0.3	1	0	1	1

M_i —How strong was country i ?

D_i —Was country i a democracy?

T —Was it after 1945?

W —Did war result?

(column) holds for the observation (row). (The numbers are illustrative only.)

The democratic peace regularity states that if, for any given observation, the attribute W assumes the value 1, then at least one of the attributes $\{D_1, D_2\}$ does not assume that value.⁸

This model is highly simplified in several respects. It assumes that the individual has access to a complete matrix of data, whereas in reality certain entries in the matrix may not be known or remembered. The model implicitly assumes also that all variables are observed with accuracy. More importantly, in our model, we assume that observations are already encoded in a particular way that facilitates identifying regularities.⁹

We will prove that, despite all these simplifying assumptions, it is hard to find regularities

in the knowledge base. Finding regularities in real knowledge bases, which are not so tidy, would be even more difficult.

The democratic peace phenomenon is an example of an *association rule*. Such a rule states that *if*, for any given observation, the values of certain attributes are within stipulated ranges, *then* the values of other attributes are within prespecified ranges. An association rule does not apply to the entire knowledge base: its scope is the set of observations that satisfies its antecedent. It follows that association rules differ from each other in their generality, or scope of applicability. Adding variables to the antecedent (weakly) decreases the scope of such a rule, but may increase its accuracy. For example, we may refine the democratic peace rule by excluding observations prior to the First World War. This will eliminate some exceptions to the rule (e.g., the War of 1812 and the Boer War) but will result in a less general rule.

A second type of regularity is a *functional rule*, a rule that points to a functional relationship between several “explanatory” variables (attributes) and another one (the “predicted” variable). A well-known example of such a rule is linear regression, with which we deal in the formal analysis. All functional rules on a given knowledge base have the same scope of applicability, or the same generality.

Both association rules and functional rules may be ranked according to accuracy and simplicity. Each criterion admits a variety of measures, depending on the specific model. In the case of linear regression, it is customary to measure accuracy by R^2 , while simplicity is often associated with a low number of variables. Irrespective of the particular measures used, people generally prefer high accuracy and low complexity. The preference for accuracy is perhaps the most obvious: rules are supposed to describe the knowledge base, and accuracy is simply the degree to which they succeed in doing so.

The preference for simplicity is subtler. A standard econometric exercise is to use a database consisting of a number of observations to derive a linear relationship between a variable of interest and other variables. The goal is to use the linear relationship to predict the variable of interest in similar situations in the future. A typical example would consist of a number of

⁷ We refer here to England’s declaration of war on Germany on September 3, 1939.

⁸ More precisely, this is the contrapositive of the democratic peace regularity.

⁹ For instance, in this matrix, country “1” is always the democratic one. But, when representing a real-life case by a row in the matrix, one may not know which country should be dubbed “1” and which “2.” This choice of encoding is immaterial in the democratic peace phenomenon, because this rule is symmetric with respect to the countries. If, however, we were to consider the rule “a democratic country would never attack another country,” encoding would matter. If the encoding system keeps country “1” as a designator of a democratic country (as long as one of the countries involved is indeed a democracy), this rule would take the form “if $D_1 = 1$ then $A_1 = 0$,” where A_i stands for “country i attacked.” If, however, the encoding system does not retain this regularity, the same rule will not be as simple to formulate. In fact, it would require a formal relation between variables, allowing to state: “For every i , if $D_i = 1$ then $A_i = 0$.” Since such relations are not part of our formal model, the model would give rise to different regularities depending on the encoding system. Indeed, finding the “appropriate” encoding is part of the problem of finding regularities in the database.

past instances in which women with breast cancer were given different treatments. Each observation would consist of the treatment, a number of diagnostic tests such as blood chemistry, location of the tumor, size of the tumor in X-rays, etc., and the degree to which the treatment was successful. These observations would be used to determine a linear relationship between the diagnostic tests and the degree of success for each treatment. The resulting relationship is then used to predict the success of future cases.

When faced with a problem such as this, a scientist need not automatically prefer fewer explanatory variables to more. The literature in statistics and machine learning provides criteria for “model selection,” and, in particular, for the inclusion of explanatory variables, in such a way as to avoid spurious correlations and “overfitting.” Our interest, however, is not in the way a scientist or an econometrician would use a database to predict future outcomes, but rather in the way an ordinary person might find relationships in his or her personal knowledge base. We maintain that, other things being equal, people tend to have more faith in the robustness of relationships that use fewer variables than in those that use more. That is, we suggest that the preference for parsimony and simplicity, as measured by the number of variables employed, is a natural tendency of the human mind.

Individuals may prefer fewer explanatory variables because of availability of data. Having a rule that involves more variables implies that more variables need to be gathered and maintained in order to use it. Importantly, it also makes it less likely that all the variables needed for the application of the rule will indeed be available in a related problem.

When fewer variables are involved, people will find it easier to make up explanations for a regularity in the data. This may be another reason for the preference for fewer variables. Be that as it may, the (normative) claim that people should prefer simpler theories to more complex ones goes back to William of Occam, and the (descriptive) claim that this is how the human mind works can also be found in Wittgenstein (1922).

In this paper, we assume that people generally prefer rules that are as accurate and as

simple as possible. Of course, these properties present one with nontrivial trade-offs. In the next section, we discuss functional rules for a given knowledge base. We will show that the feasible set in the accuracy-simplicity space cannot be easily computed. A similar result can be shown for association rules. We choose to focus on linear regression for two reasons. First, in economics it is a more common technique for uncovering rules. Second, our main result is less straightforward in the case of linear regression.

II. The Complexity of Linear Regression

In this section, we study the trade-off between simplicity and accuracy of functional rules in the case of linear regression. While regression analysis is a basic tool of scientific research, here we view it as an idealized model of nonprofessional human reasoning.¹⁰ For a given variable, one attempts to find those variables that predict the variable of interest. A common measure of amount of variation in the variable of interest that is explained by the predicting variables is the coefficient of determination, R^2 . A reasonable measure of complexity is the number of explanatory variables one uses. The “adjusted R^2 ” is frequently used as a measure of the quality of a regression, trading off accuracy and simplicity. Adjusted R^2 essentially levies a multiplicative penalty for additional variables to offset the spurious increase in R^2 which results from an increase in the number of predicting variables. In recent years statisticians and econometricians for the most part have used additive penalty functions in model specification (choosing the predicting variables) for a regression problem.¹¹ The different penalties are associated with different criteria determining the trade-off between parsimony and precision. Each penalty function can be viewed as defining preferences over the number of included variables and R^2 , reflecting the trade-off between simplicity and accuracy. Rather than choose a specific penalty function,

¹⁰ See Margaret Bray and Nathan Savin (1986), who used regression analysis to model the learning of economic agents.

¹¹ See, e.g., Trevor Hastie et al. (2001) for a discussion of model specification and penalty functions.

we assume more generally that an individual can be ascribed a function $u : \mathbb{R}_+ \times [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, which represents her preferences for simplicity and accuracy, where $u(k, r)$ is her utility for a regression that attains $R^2 = r$ with k explanatory variables. Thus, if $u(\cdot, \cdot)$ is decreasing in its first argument and increasing in the second, a person who chooses a rule so as to maximize u may be viewed as though she prefers both simplicity and accuracy, and trades them off as described by u .

Our aim is to demonstrate that finding “good” rules is a difficult computational task. We use the concept of NP-Completeness from computer science to formalize the notion of difficulty of solving problems. A yes/no problem is NP if it is easy (can be performed in polynomial worst-case time complexity) to verify that a suggested solution is indeed a solution to it. If an NP problem is also NP-Complete, then there is at present no known algorithm, whose (worst-case time) complexity is polynomial, that can solve it. NP-Completeness, however, means more than that there is no such known algorithm. The nonexistence of such an algorithm is not due to the fact that the problem is new or unstudied. For NP-Complete problems, it is known that if a polynomial algorithm were found for one of them, such an algorithm could be translated into polynomial algorithms for all other problems in NP. Thus, a problem that is NP-Complete is at least as hard as many problems that have been extensively studied for years and for which no polynomial algorithm has yet been found.

We emphasize again that the rules we discuss do not necessarily offer complete theories, identify causal relationships, provide predictions, or suggest courses of action. Rules are regularities that hold in a given knowledge base, and they may be purely coincidental. Rules may be associated with theories, but we do not purport to model the process of developing and choosing among theories.

Assume that we are trying to predict a variable \mathbf{Y} given the explanatory variables $\mathbf{X} = (\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_m)$. For a subset K of $\{\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_m\}$, let R_K^2 be the value of the coefficient of determination R^2 when we regress $(y_i)_{i \leq n}$ on $(x_{ij})_{i \leq n, j \in K}$. We assume that the data are given in their entirety, that is, that there are no missing values.

How does one select a set of explanatory variables? First, consider the feasible set of rules projected onto the accuracy-complexity space. For a set of explanatory variables \mathbf{K} , let the degree of complexity be $k = |\mathbf{K}|$ and a degree of accuracy $r = R_K^2$. Consider the k - r space and, for a given knowledge base $\mathbf{X} = (\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_m)$ and a variable \mathbf{Y} , denote by $F(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y})$ the set of pairs (k, r) for which there exists a rule with these parameters. Because the set $F(\mathbf{X})$ is defined only for integer values of k , and for certain values of r , it is more convenient to visualize its comprehensive closure defined by:

$$F'(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}) \equiv \{(k, r) \in \mathbb{R}_+ \\ \times [0, 1] \mid \exists (k', r') \in F(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}), k \geq k', r \leq r'\}.$$

The set $F'(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y})$ is schematically illustrated in Figure 1. Note that it need not be convex.

The optimization problem that such a person with utility function $u(\cdot, \cdot)$ faces is depicted in Figure 2.

This optimization problem is hard to solve, because one generally cannot know its feasible set. In fact, for every $r > 0$, given $\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, k$, determining whether $(k, r) \in F'(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y})$ is computationally hard:

THEOREM 1: *For every $r \in (0, 1]$, the following problem is NP-Complete: Given explanatory variables $\mathbf{X} = (\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_m)$, a variable \mathbf{Y} , and an integer $k \geq 1$, is there a subset \mathbf{K} of $\{\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_m\}$ such that $|\mathbf{K}| \leq k$ and $R_K^2 \geq r$?*

Theorem 1 explains why people may be surprised to learn of simple regularities that exist in a knowledge base they have access to. A person who has access to the data should, in principle, be able to assess the veracity of all linear theories pertaining to these data. Yet, due to computational complexity, this capability remains theoretical. In practice, one may often find that one has overlooked a simple linear regularity that, once pointed out, seems evident.

We show that, for any positive value of r , it is hard to determine whether a given k is in the r -cut of $F'(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y})$ when the input is $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, k)$. By contrast, for a given k , computing the k -cut of




FIGURE 1




FIGURE 2

$F'(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y})$ is a polynomial problem (when the input is $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, r)$), bounded by a polynomial of degree k . Recall, however, that k is bounded only by the number of columns in \mathbf{X} . Moreover, even if k is small, a polynomial of degree k may assume large values if m is large. We conclude that, in general, finding the frontier of the set $F'(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y})$, as a function of \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{Y} , is a hard problem. The optimization problem depicted in Figure 2 has a fuzzy feasible set, as described in Figure 3.

A decision maker may choose a functional rule that maximizes $u(k, r)$ out of all the rules she is aware of, but the latter are likely to constitute only a subset of the set of rules defining the actual set $F'(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y})$. Hence, many of the rules that people formulate are not necessar-

ily the simplest (for a given degree of accuracy) or the most accurate (for a given degree of complexity).

We conclude this section with the observation that one may prove theorems similar to Theorem 1, which would make explicit reference to a certain function $u(k, r)$. The following is an example of such a theorem.

THEOREM 2: *For every $r \in (0, 1]$, the following problem is NP-Complete: given explanatory variables $\mathbf{X} = (\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_m)$ and a variable \mathbf{Y} , is there a subset \mathbf{K} of $\{\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_m\}$ that obtains an adjusted R^2 of at least r ?*

As is clear from the proof of Theorem 2, this result does not depend on the specific measure




FIGURE 3

of the accuracy-simplicity trade-off, and similar results can be proven for a variety of functions $u(k, r)$.¹²

III. Discussion

A. Approximation

We posed a particular question—does there exist a set of k explanatory variables for which the adjusted R^2 is at least r ?—and showed that it is NP-Complete. We argue that an implication of the result is that people will generally not know the regularities that exist in their knowledge base. But it is possible that, while it may be extremely difficult to get an *exact* answer to the question “What is the maximum R^2 possible with k variables?,” it may be dramatically easier to obtain a very good *approximation* to such a question. If there are fast heuristics that do reasonably well on the regression problem, the scope of fact-free learning may be quite limited.

However, it is generally *not* the case that NP-Complete problems admit polynomial approximations. Consider, for instance, the NP-Complete problem *Minimum Exact Cover*, which can be described as follows. Given a set S and a set of subsets of S , \mathcal{S} , is there a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets of S in \mathcal{S}

whose union equals S ? This is the yes/no problem we have used in the proof of Theorem 1.¹³ To define the notion of approximation, one defines an optimization problem that corresponds to the yes/no problem. For instance, the Minimum Exact Cover problem can be viewed as corresponding to the following optimization problem: minimize the sum of the cardinalities of the sets in a collection that covers S . If the solution is the cardinality of S , an exact cover has been identified.

How good an approximation can one get to the problem—minimize the sum of the cardinalities of the sets that cover S —with an algorithm that is polynomial in the size of the problem? Suppose, for example, that one wanted an algorithm that had the property that, for all problems in this class, if the minimum possible sum for the problem were n , the algorithm would find a set of subsets with total cardinality λn for some $\lambda > 1$. (λ might be thought of as the accuracy of the approximation.) It is known that there does not exist such a polynomial algorithm, *no matter how large λ is*, unless $P = NP$ (Carston Lund and Mihalis Yannakakis, 1994; Ran Raz and Shmuel Safra, 1997). In other words, finding an algorithm that assures *any* degree of reliability for large prob-

¹² There are, however, functions v for which the result does *not* hold. For example, consider $v(k, r) = \min(r, 2 - k)$. This function obtains its maximum at $k = 1$ and it is therefore easy to maximize it.

¹³ That is, our proof consists of showing that any instance of the Minimum Exact Cover problem can be translated, via a polynomial algorithm, to an instance of the problem defined in Theorem 1, such that the answer to the latter is “yes” iff “so” is the answer to the former.

lems is as hard as solving NP-Complete problems themselves.

We should emphasize that the difficulty in approximating the minimum exact cover problem doesn't assure that it is equally difficult to approximate our regression problem. An algorithm that provides a good approximation to one problem will not necessarily translate into a good approximation to other problems. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine how well one might approximate the regression problem analyzed above, we note that many (if not most) of the NP-Complete problems whose approximation have been studied turned out to be difficult to approximate.¹⁴

B. *The Relevance of NP-Completeness*

We maintain that a problem that is NP-Complete will be hard for economic agents to solve. Agents may obtain or learn the optimal solutions to particular instances of the general problem, especially if they are interested only in instances described by small inputs. But should economic agents encounter new instances of reasonable sizes on a regular basis, high computational complexity implies that it is unlikely that all, or most, agents in the economy would determine the optimal solutions in these instances.

In the case of fact-free learning, economic agents are called upon to find regularities in large knowledge bases. These regularities cannot be uncovered once and for all. The economic and political environment changes constantly and the lore of yesterday does not provide a blueprint for the decisions of tomorrow. It is therefore reasonable to model economic agents as problem solvers who constantly need to cope with new and large problems.

One can argue that NP-Completeness is a concept that relates to the way computers perform computations, and has little or no bearing on human reasoning. Indeed, there are problems such as natural language understanding or face recognition that toddlers perform better than do computers. But these are problems for which

finding an appropriate mathematical model is a major part of the solution. By contrast, for well-defined combinatorial problems such as those in the class NP, it is rarely the case that humans perform better than do computers. Our modest claim is that it is safe to assume that neither people nor computers can solve NP-Complete problems optimally.

One may question the use of complexity concepts that are defined by worst-case analysis. Indeed, why would we worry about an algorithm whose worst-case performance is exponential, if it is polynomial on average? Experience, however, indicates that NP-Complete problems do not tend to be efficiently solvable even in expectation, under any reasonable assumptions on the distribution of inputs.¹⁵

We do not claim that the inability to solve NP-Complete problems is necessarily the most important cognitive limitation on people's ability to perform induction. As mentioned above, even polynomial problems can be difficult to solve when the knowledge base consists of many cases and many attributes. Moreover, it is often the case that looking for a general rule does not even cross someone's mind. Yet, the difficulty of performing induction shares with NP-Complete problems this central property: while it is hard to come up with a solution to such a problem, it is easy to verify whether a suggested solution is valid.

People need not be lazy or irrational to explain why they do not find all relevant rules. Rather, looking for simple regularities is a genuinely hard problem. There is nothing irrational about not being able to solve NP-Complete problems. Faced with the problem of selecting a set of explanatory variables, which is NP-Complete, people may use various heuristics to find prediction rules, but they cannot be sure, in general, that the rules they find are the simplest or most accurate ones.

¹⁵ See Christos Papadimitriou (1994), who makes this point and emphasizes that the example of linear programming confirms this experience. Indeed, the Simplex algorithm has exponential worst-case time complexity but very good expected complexity. Linear programming, however, is *not* an NP-Complete problem, and there are now algorithms to solve linear programming problems with polynomial worst-case performance.

¹⁴ See, for example, the descriptions of attainable approximations to NP-Complete problems on the Web site, "A Compendium of NP Optimization Problems" (<http://www.nada.kth.se/~viggo/problemlist/compendium.html>).

C. Implications

Agreeing to Disagree.—Our model suggests two reasons why people may have different beliefs, even if these beliefs are defined by rules that are derived from a shared knowledge base. First, two people may notice different regularities. Since finding the “best” regularities is a hard problem, we should not be surprised if one person failed to see a regularity that another came up with. Second, even if the individuals share the rules that they found, they may entertain different beliefs if they make different trade-offs between the accuracy and the simplicity of rules. Different people may well have different u functions, with some people more willing to sacrifice accuracy for simpler rules. If two individuals choose different levels of simplicity, they may also disagree on the relevance of a characteristic. In particular, a variable that is important when there are relatively few other variables in a regression may not be important if the number of variables considered increases. Thus, a particular attribute may play a large role in the rule one person uses, but no role in the rule another employs.

Locally Optimal Rules.—Our central point is that people use rules that are not fully optimal because of the complexity of the problem of finding fully optimal rules. When an individual uses a rule that is less than fully optimal, she may improve upon the rule by considering alternatives to it. A person faced with the regression problem may think of alternatives to her current “best” regression by adding or deleting variables from her current included set, or by replacing variables in the included set with others. While we do not formally model this search and revision process, one can imagine two distinct ways people may update the rules they use. One can search “locally,” that is, consider relatively minor changes in the current rule such as adding, deleting, or replacing one or two variables; or one can search “globally,” by considering sets of variables that have no relation whatsoever to the current set of variables. Local search may find local optima that are not global optima. Differently put, people may get “stuck” with suboptimal rules that can be improved upon only with a “paradigm shift” which con-

siders a completely different way of looking at a problem.

Path Dependence.—When individuals search locally for improved rules, their reasoning is likely to exhibit path dependence. Two individuals who begin with different initial sets of variables can settle on very different rules, even after very long search times.

Regret.—Our model suggests different notions of regret. In a standard model, individuals make optimal choices, given the information available to them at the time they decide. In a stochastic environment, an individual may wish *ex post* that she had decided differently. A rational person, however, has no reason to regret a decision she had taken since she could have done no better at the time of her decision, given the information available to her at that time. In our model, there are two notions in which information can be “given,” and, correspondingly, two possible sources of regret. As usual, one may learn the realization of a random variable and wish that she had decided differently. But one can also learn of a rule that one has not been aware of, even though the rule could be derived, in principle, from one’s knowledge base. Should one feel regret as a result? As argued above, one could not be expected to solve NP-Complete problems, and therefore it may be argued that one could not have chosen optimally. Yet, one might expect individuals to experience a stronger sense of “I should have known” as a result of finding rules that hold in a given knowledge base, than as a result of getting new observations.

D. Related Literature

Most of the formal literature in economic theory and in related fields is based on the Bayesian model of information processing. In this model, a decision maker starts out with a prior probability, and she updates it in the face of new information by Bayes’s rule. Hence, this model captures nicely changes in opinion that result from new information. But it does not deal very graciously with changes of opinion that are not driven by new information. In fact,

in a Bayesian model with perfect rationality, people cannot change their opinions unless new information has been received. It follows that the example we started out with cannot be explained by such models.

Relaxing the perfect rationality assumption, one may attempt to provide a pseudo-Bayesian account of the phenomena discussed here. For instance, one can use a space of states of the world to describe the subjective uncertainty that a decision maker has regarding the result of a computation, before this computation is carried out (see Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli, 1994; Nabil Al-Najjar et al., 1999). In such a model, one would be described as if one entertained a prior probability of, say, p , that “democratic peace” holds. Upon hearing the rhetorical question as in our dialogue, the decision maker performs the computation of the accuracy of this rule, and is described as if the result of this computation were new information.

A related approach employs a subjective state space to provide a Bayesian account of unforeseen contingencies (see David Kreps, 1979, 1992; Eddie Dekel et al., 1997, 1998). Should this approach be applied to the problem of induction, each regularity that might hold in the knowledge base would be viewed as an unforeseen contingency that might arise. A decision maker’s behavior will then be viewed as arising from Bayesian optimization with respect to a subjective state space that reflects her subjective uncertainty.

Our approach is compatible with these pseudo-Bayesian models. Its relative strength is that it models the process of induction more explicitly, allowing a better understanding of why and when induction is likely to be a hard problem.

Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) offer a theory of case-based decision making. They argue that cases are the primitive objects of knowledge, and that rules and probabilities are derived from cases. Moreover, rules and probabilities cannot be known in the same sense, and to the same degree of certitude, that cases can. Yet, rules and probabilities may be efficient and insightful ways of succinctly summarizing many cases. The present paper suggests that summarizing knowledge bases by rules may involve loss of information, because one cannot be guaranteed

to find the “optimal” rules that a given knowledge base induces.

APPENDIX: PROOFS

PROOF OF THEOREM 1:

Let there be given $r > 0$. It is easy to see that the problem is in NP: given a suggested set $\mathbf{K} \subset \{1, \dots, m\}$, one may calculate R_K^2 in polynomial time in $|\mathbf{K}|n$ (which is bounded by the size of the input, $(m + 1)n$).¹⁶ To show that the problem is NP-Complete, we use a reduction of the following problem, which is known to be NP-Complete (see Michael Gary and David Johnson, 1979; or Papadimitriou, 1994):

Problem Exact Cover: Given a set S , a set of subsets of S , \mathfrak{S} , are there pairwise disjoint subsets in \mathfrak{S} whose union equals S ?

(That is, does a subset of \mathfrak{S} constitute a partition of S ?)

Given a set S , a set of subsets of S , \mathfrak{S} , we will generate n observations of $(m + 1)$ variables, $(x_{ij})_{i \leq n, j \leq m}$ and $(y_i)_{i \leq n}$, and a natural number k , such that S has an exact cover in \mathfrak{S} iff there is a subset \mathbf{K} of $\{1, \dots, m\}$ with $|\mathbf{K}| \leq k$ and $R_K^2 \geq r$.

Let there be given, then, S and \mathfrak{S} . Assume without loss of generality that $S = \{1, \dots, s\}$, and that $\mathfrak{S} = \{S_1, \dots, S_l\}$ (where $s, l \geq 1$ are natural numbers). We construct $n = 2(s + l + 1)$ observations of $m = 2l$ predicting variables. It will be convenient to denote the $2l$ predicting variables by $\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_l$ and $\mathbf{Z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Z}_l$ and the predicted variable—by \mathbf{Y} . Their corresponding values will be denoted $(x_{ij})_{i \leq n, j \leq l}$, $(z_{ij})_{i \leq n, j \leq l}$, and $(y_i)_{i \leq n}$. We will use $\mathbf{X}_j, \mathbf{Z}_j$, and \mathbf{Y} also to denote the column vectors $(x_{ij})_{i \leq n}$, $(z_{ij})_{i \leq n}$, and $(y_i)_{i \leq n}$, respectively. Let $M \geq 0$ be a constant to be specified later. We now specify the vectors $\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_l, \mathbf{Z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Z}_l$, and \mathbf{Y} as a function of M .

¹⁶ Here and in the sequel, we assume that reading an entry in the matrix \mathbf{X} or in the vector \mathbf{Y} , as well as any algebraic computation, requires a single time unit. Our results hold also if one assumes that x_{ij} and y_i are all rational and take into account the time it takes to read and manipulate these numbers.

For $i \leq s$ and $j \leq l$, $x_{ij} = 1$ if $i \in S_j$, and $x_{ij} = 0$ if $i \notin S_j$;
 For $i \leq s$ and $j \leq l$, $z_{ij} = 0$;
 For $s < i \leq s + l$ and $j \leq l$, $x_{ij} = z_{ij} = 1$ if $i = s + j$ and $x_{ij} = z_{ij} = 0$ if $i \neq s + j$;
 For $j \leq l$, $x_{s+l+1,j} = z_{s+l+1,j} = 0$;
 For $i \leq s + l$, $y_i = 1$ and $y_{s+l+1} = M$;
 For $i > s + l + 1$, $y_i = -y_{i-(s+l+1)}$ and for all $j \leq l$, $x_{ij} = -x_{i-(s+l+1),j}$ and $z_{ij} = -z_{i-(s+l+1),j}$.

Observe that the bottom half of the matrix \mathbf{X} , as well as the bottom half of the vector \mathbf{Y} , are the negatives of the respective top halves. This implies that each of the variables $\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_j, \mathbf{Z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Z}_l$, and \mathbf{Y} has a mean of zero. This, in turn, implies that for any set of variables \mathbf{K} , when we regress \mathbf{Y} on \mathbf{K} , we get a regression equation with a zero intercept.

Consider the matrix \mathbf{X} and the vector \mathbf{Y} obtained above by the construction for different values of M . Observe that the collection of sets \mathbf{K} that maximize R_K^2 is independent of M . Hence, it is useful to define \hat{R}_K^2 as the R^2 obtained from regressing \mathbf{Y} on \mathbf{K} , ignoring observations $s + l + 1$ and $2(s + l + 1)$. Obviously, minimizing \hat{R}_K^2 is tantamount to minimizing R_K^2 .

We claim that there is a subset \mathbf{K} of $\{\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_j\} \cup \{\mathbf{Z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Z}_l\}$ with $|\mathbf{K}| \leq k \equiv l$ for which $\hat{R}_K^2 = 1$ iff S has an exact cover from \mathcal{S} .

First assume that such a cover exists. That is, assume that there is a set $J \subset \{1, \dots, l\}$ such that $\{S_j\}_{j \in J}$ constitutes a partition of S . This means that $\sum_{j \in J} 1_{S_j} = 1_S$ where 1_A is the indicator function of a set A . Let α be the intercept, $(\beta_j)_{j \leq l}$ be the coefficients of $(\mathbf{X}_j)_{j \leq l}$ and $(\gamma_j)_{j \leq l}$ —of $(\mathbf{Z}_j)_{j \leq l}$ in the regression. Set $\alpha = 0$. For $j \in J$, set $\beta_j = 1$ and $\gamma_j = 0$, and for $j \notin J$ set $\beta_j = 0$ and $\gamma_j = 1$. We claim that $\alpha \mathbf{1} + \sum_{j \leq l} \beta_j \mathbf{X}_j + \sum_{j \leq l} \gamma_j \mathbf{Z}_j = \mathbf{Y}$ where $\mathbf{1}$ is a vector of 1's. For $i \leq s$ the equality

$$\alpha + \sum_{j \leq l} \beta_j x_{ij} + \sum_{j \leq l} \gamma_j z_{ij} = \sum_{j \leq l} \beta_j x_{ij} = y_i = 1$$

follows from $\sum_{j \in J} 1_{S_j} = 1_S$. For $s < i \leq s + l$, the equality

$$\alpha + \sum_{j \leq l} \beta_j x_{ij} + \sum_{j \leq l} \gamma_j z_{ij} = \beta_j + \gamma_j = y_i = 1$$

follows from our construction (assigning precisely one of $\{\beta_j, \gamma_j\}$ to 1 and the other—to 0). Obviously, $\alpha + \sum_{j \leq l} \beta_j x_{nj} + \sum_{j \leq l} \gamma_j z_{nj} = 0 = y_i = 0$. The number of variables used in this regression is l . Specifically, choose $\mathbf{K} = \{\mathbf{X}_j | j \in J\} \cup \{\mathbf{Z}_j | j \notin J\}$, with $|\mathbf{K}| = l$, and observe that $\hat{R}_K^2 = 1$.

We now turn to the converse direction. Assume, then, that there is a subset \mathbf{K} of $\{\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_j\} \cup \{\mathbf{Z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Z}_l\}$ with $|\mathbf{K}| \leq l$ for which $\hat{R}_K^2 = 1$. Since all variables have zero means, this regression has an intercept of zero ($\alpha = 0$ in the notation above). Let $J \subset \{1, \dots, l\}$ be the set of indices of the \mathbf{X} variables in \mathbf{K} , i.e., $\{\mathbf{X}_j\}_{j \in J} = \mathbf{K} \cap \{\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_j\}$. We will show that $\{S_j\}_{j \in J}$ constitutes a partition of S . Let $L \subset \{1, \dots, l\}$ be the set of indices of the \mathbf{Z} variables in \mathbf{K} , i.e., $\{\mathbf{Z}_j\}_{j \in L} = \mathbf{K} \cap \{\mathbf{Z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Z}_l\}$. Consider the coefficients of the variables in \mathbf{K} used in the regression obtaining $\hat{R}_K^2 = 1$. Denote them by $(\beta_j)_{j \in J}$ and $(\gamma_j)_{j \in L}$. Define $\beta_j = 0$ if $j \notin J$ and $\gamma_j = 0$ if $j \notin L$. Thus, we have

$$\sum_{j \leq l} \beta_j \mathbf{X}_j + \sum_{j \leq l} \gamma_j \mathbf{Z}_j = \mathbf{Y}$$

We argue that $\beta_j = 1$ for every $j \in J$, and $\gamma_j = 1$ for every $j \in L$. To see this, observe first that for every $j \leq l$, the $s + j$ observation implies that $\beta_j + \gamma_j = 1$. This means that for every $j \leq l$, $\beta_j \neq 0$ or $\gamma_j \neq 0$ (this also implies that either $j \in J$ or $j \in L$). If for some j both $\beta_j \neq 0$ and $\gamma_j \neq 0$, we will have $|\mathbf{K}| > l$, a contradiction. Hence for every $j \leq l$, either $\beta_j \neq 0$ or $\gamma_j \neq 0$, but not both. (In other words, $J = L^c$.) This also implies that the non-zero coefficient out of $\{\beta_j, \gamma_j\}$ has to be 1.

Thus, the cardinality of \mathbf{K} is precisely l , and the coefficients $\{\beta_j, \gamma_j\}$ define a subset of $\{S_1, \dots, S_l\}$: if $\beta_j = 1$ and $\gamma_j = 0$, i.e., $j \in J$, S_j is included in the subset, and if $\beta_j = 0$ and $\gamma_j = 1$, i.e., $j \notin J$, S_j is not included in the subset. That this subset $\{S_j\}_{j \in J}$ constitutes a partition of S follows from the first s observations as above.

We now turn to define M . We wish to do so in such a way that, for every set of explanatory variables K , $R_K^2 \geq r$ iff $\hat{R}_K^2 = 1$. Fix a set \mathbf{K} .

Denote by \widehat{SSR} and \widehat{SST} the explained variance and the total variance, respectively, of the regression of \mathbf{Y} on \mathbf{K} without observations $s +$

$l + 1$ and $2(s + l + 1)$, where SSR and SST denote the variances of the regression with all observations. Thus, $R_K^2 = \text{SSR}/\text{SST}$ and $\hat{R}_K^2 = \widehat{\text{SSR}}/\widehat{\text{SST}}$. Observe that $\widehat{\text{SST}} = 2(s + l)$ and $\text{SST} = 2(s + l) + 2M^2$. Also, $\text{SSR} = \widehat{\text{SSR}}$ is independent of M .

Note that if \mathbf{K} is such that $\hat{R}_K^2 = 1$, then $(\text{SSR} =) \widehat{\text{SSR}} = \widehat{\text{SST}} = 2(s + l)$. In this case, $R_K^2 = [2(s + l)]/[2(s + l) + 2M^2]$. If, however, \mathbf{K} is such that $\hat{R}_K^2 < 1$, then we argue that $(\text{SSR} =) \widehat{\text{SSR}} \leq \widehat{\text{SST}} - 1/9$. Assume not. That is, assume that K is such that $\widehat{\text{SSR}} > \widehat{\text{SST}} - 1/9$. This implies that on each of the observations $1, \dots, s + l, s + l + 2, \dots, 2(s + l) + 1$, the fit produced by \mathbf{K} is at most $1/3$ away from y_j . Then for every $j \leq l$, $|\beta_j + \gamma_j - 1| < 1/3$. Hence for every $j \leq l$ either $\beta_j \neq 0$ or $\gamma_j \neq 0$, but not both, and the non-zero coefficient out of $\{\beta_j, \gamma_j\}$ has to be in $(2/3, 4/3)$. But then, considering the first s observations, we find that \mathbf{K} is an exact cover. It follows that, if $\hat{R}_K^2 < 1$, then $R_K^2 \leq [2(s + l) - 1/9]/[2(s + l) + 2M^2]$.

Choose a rational M in the interval $(\sqrt{[(1 - r)(s + l) - 1/18]}/r, \sqrt{[(1 - r)(s + l)]}/r)$ so that $[2(s + l) - 1/9]/[2(s + l) + 2M^2] < r < [2(s + l)]/[2(s + l) + 2M^2]$, and observe that for this M , there exists a \mathbf{K} such that $R_K^2 \geq r$ iff there exists a \mathbf{K} for which $\hat{R}_K^2 = 1$, that is, iff \mathbf{K} is an exact cover.

To conclude the proof, it remains to observe that the construction of the variables $(\mathbf{X}_j)_{j \leq l}$, $(\mathbf{Z}_j)_{j \leq l}$, and \mathbf{Y} can be done in polynomial time in the size of the input.

PROOF OF THEOREM 2:

Let there be given $r > 0$. The proof follows that of Theorem 1, with the following modification. For an integer $t \geq 1$, to be specified later, we add t observations for which all the variables $((\mathbf{X}_j)_{j \leq l}, (\mathbf{Z}_j)_{j \leq l},$ and $\mathbf{Y})$ assume the value 0. These observations do not change the R^2 obtained by any set of regressors, as both SST and SSR remain the same. Assuming that t has been fixed (and that it is polynomial in the data), let r' be the R^2 corresponding to an adjusted R^2 of r , with l regressors. That is, $(1 - r') = (1 - r)(t + 2s + 2l + 1)/(t + 2s + l + 1)$. Define M as in the proof of Theorem 1 for r' .

We claim that there exists a set of regressors that obtains an adjusted R^2 of r iff there exists a set of l regressors that obtains an R^2 of r' (hence, iff there exists an exact cover in the original problem). The “if” part is obvious from our construction. Consider the “only if” part. Assume, then, that a set of regressors obtains an adjusted R^2 of r . If it has l regressors, the same calculation shows that it obtains the desired R^2 . We now argue that if no set of l regressors obtains an adjusted R^2 of r , then no set of regressors (of any cardinality) obtains an adjusted R^2 of r .

Consider first a set \mathbf{K}_0 with $|\mathbf{K}_0| = k_0 > l$ regressors. Observe that, by the choice of M , r' is the upper bound on all R_K^2 for all \mathbf{K} with $|\mathbf{K}| = l$, as r' was computed assuming that an exact cover exists, and that, therefore, there are l variables that perfectly match all the observations but $s + l + 1$ and $2(s + l + 1)$. Due to the structure of the problem, r' is also an upper bound on R_K^2 for all \mathbf{K} with $|\mathbf{K}| \geq l$. This is so because the only observations that are not perfectly matched (in the hypothesized l -regressor set) correspond to zero values of the regressors. It follows that the adjusted R^2 for K_0 is lower than r .

Next, consider a set \mathbf{K}_0 with $|\mathbf{K}_0| = k_0 < l$ regressors. For such a set there exists a $j \leq l$ such that neither \mathbf{X}_j nor \mathbf{Z}_j are in \mathbf{K}_0 . Hence, observations $s + j$ and $2s + l + j + 1$ cannot be matched by the regression on \mathbf{K}_0 . The lowest possible SSE in this problem, corresponding to the hypothesized set of l regressors, is $2M^2$. This means that the SSE of \mathbf{K}_0 is at least $2M^2 + 2$. That is, the SSE of the set \mathbf{K}_0 is at least $(M^2 + 1)/M^2$ larger than the SSE used for the calculation of r . On the other hand, \mathbf{K}_0 uses fewer variables. But if $(t + 2s + l + 1)/(t + 2s + k + 1) < (M^2 + 1)/M^2$, the reduction in the number of variables cannot pay off, and \mathbf{K}_0 has an adjusted R^2 lower than r . It remains to choose t large enough so that the above inequality holds, and to observe that this t is bounded by a polynomial of the input size.

REFERENCES

Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon and Ozdenoren, Emre. “Probabilistic Repre-

- sensation of Complexity.” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 2003, *111*(1), pp. 49–87.
- Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo.** “Incomplete Written Contracts: Indescribable States of Nature.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1994, *109*(4), pp. 1085–1124.
- Bray, Margaret M. and Savin, Nathan E.** “Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification.” *Econometrica*, 1986, *54*(5), pp. 1129–60.
- Dekel, Eddie; Lipman, Barton and Rustichini, Aldo.** “A Unique Subjective State Space for Unforeseen Contingencies.” Unpublished Paper, 1997.
- Dekel, Eddie; Lipman, Barton L. and Rustichini, Aldo.** “Recent Developments in Modeling Unforeseen Contingencies.” *European Economic Review*, 1998, *42*(3–5), pp. 523–42.
- Gary, Michael R. and Johnson, David S.** *Computers and intractability: A guide to the theory of NP-completeness*. San Francisco: W. Freeman and Co., 1979.
- Gilboa, Itzhak and Schmeidler, David.** *A Theory of case-based decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Goodman, Nelson.** *Fact, fiction and forecast*, 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
- Hastie, Trevor; Tibshirani, Robert and Friedman, Jerome.** *The elements of statistical learning*. New York: Springer, 2001.
- Kreps, David M.** “A Representation Theorem for ‘Preference for Flexibility’.” *Econometrica*, 1979, *47*(3), pp. 565–77.
- Kreps, David M.** “Static Choice in the Presence of Unforeseen Contingencies,” in Partha Dasgupta, Douglas Gale, Oliver Hart and Eric Maskin, eds., *Economic analysis of markets and games: Essays in honor of Frank Hahn*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992, pp. 258–81.
- La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert.** “The Quality of Government.” Unpublished paper, 1998.
- Lund, Carston and Yannakakis, Mihalis.** “On the Hardness of Approximating Minimization Problems.” *Journal of the ACM*, 1994, *41*(5), pp. 960–81.
- Mallows, Colin.** “Some Comments on C_p .” *Technometrics*, 1973, *15*(4), pp. 661–75.
- Maoz, Zeev and Russett, Bruce.** “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986.” *American Political Science Review*, 1993, *87*(3), pp. 624–38.
- Papadimitriou, Christos H.** *Computational complexity*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1994.
- Raz, Ran and Safra, Shmuel.** “A Sub-constant Error-Probability Low-Degree Test, and Sub-constant Error-Probability PCP Characterization of NP,” in *Proceedings of the 29th annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computation*. New York, ACM Press, 1997, pp. 475–84.
- Simon, Herbert.** “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” *Quarterly Review of Economics*, 1955, *69*(1), pp. 99–118.
- Tibshirani, Robert J.** “Regression Shrinkage and Selection via the Lasso.” *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B*, 1996, *58*(1), pp. 267–88.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig.** *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. 1922. Reprint, London: Routledge, 1961.